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15. The striking success of the National Labor 
Relations Act 
Michael L. Wachter1 
INTRODUCTION 
In the United States today. less than I 0 percent of private sector employment is union­
ized .2 After peaking at  35 percent of employment in the early 1950s, union membership 
has been in decline for the last 59 years. This decline represents one of the most impor­
tant institutional shifts in the United States economy. Reflecting this decline. a common 
theme among academic legal commentators is that the law governing unionization and 
collective bargaining, the National Labor Relations Act ( NL RA) .  has been a terrible 
failure. In this chapter I will make the counter-claim- that the N LRA has been largely 
successful and in one key area exceedingly successful. Its presumed failure, if the word 
failure needs to be maintained, is largely due to its successes .  
Before judging the N LRA to be a success or fai lure, measures of success have to be 
identified. I will judge the success o f  the N LRA by whether the two explicit goals of the 
Wagner Act of 1935 have been achieved. The goals are industrial peace and a greater 
balance in bargaining power between employers and employees. 
The first of the goals is industrial peace. The preamble of the Wagner Act starts 
by identifying that the "denial by some employers of the right of employees to orga­
nize" and bargain collectively had led "to strikes and other forms of industrial strife 
or unrest. "3 Industrial strife and unrest at  the time of  the passage of  the Wagner 
Act meant more than the inconvenient strikes that we sometimes experience today. 
Instead, it meant violent strikes that paralyzed the national economy and frequently 
required the deployment of the National Guard or federal troops to restore order. 
Indeed, in the midst of the Great Depression the question was whether the then­
prevail ing political economy would survive. Critical to the stability of the political 
economy was adopting a legal regime for labor that would replace indust rial st rife 
with industrial peace. 
A second goal is to redress "inequality of bargaining power." I n  the words of the 
Act, "[t]he inequality of bargaining power . . .  substantially burdens and affects the 
flow of commerce. and tends to aggravate recurrent business depressions. by depress­
ing wage rates and the purchasing power of wage earners in industr y  and by preventing 
the stabilization of competitive wage rates and working conditions within and between 
industries ."4 The goal was not true equality but rather giving employees meaningful 
bargaining power .  
T o  evaluate the success of  the N LRA, I will treat it as one of four alternative legal 
regimes, all or which have actually existed in the United States since the beginning of the 
New Deal, and will ask which of the four is most likely to achieve the two goals. In terms 
of terminology. I note that the N L RA has been amended several times since the original 
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Act - the Wagner Act - was first passed in 1 93 5 .  When I use the term NLRA, I refer to 
the labor law as it  exists today. 
The first of the alternative legal regimes is the National Industrial Recovery Act 
(N IRA) of 1933. which was the first attempt in the U nited States to give workers the 
right to act in concert without employer interference and to encourage collective bar­
gaining. The second is the original NLRA - the Wagner Act - as passed in 1 935 .  The 
third is today's N LRA, which includes the major Taft-Hartley Amendments of 1947. 
The fourth legal regime is the patchwork of employment laws that regulate today's non­
union sector. 
It is also useful to think of these legal regimes as constituting alternative political 
economies. Here the fou r  legal regimes constitute three alternative political economies 
since the NLRA of today and the non-union sector of today constitute a single political 
economy. Since both the NIRA and the Wagner Act envisioned widespread unioniza­
tion, I do not discuss the non-union sectors that co-existed when those laws were in 
effect . 
In addition, each of the four legal regimes corresponds with a distinct economic 
model. The economic model of the N IRA was cartelization, where both wages and prices 
were set collect ively with government oversight . The economic model of the Wagner 
Act was also a cartelization model, but only of the labor market. I t  was envisioned that 
collective bargaining would become the primary vehicle for wage setting and would, in  
t ime. embrace most eligible workers. Hence, wages would be set by the dictates of the 
collective bargaining process and not the dictates of the marketplace. Unions would have 
monopoly power in the labor market, but firms would not have monopoly power in their 
product markets. 
The third legal regime is the modern N LRA, which includes the Taft-Hartley 
Amendments .  That legal regime envisioned that unionization would not spread through­
out the economy and that non-union employers would emerge within each industry t o  
compete with unionized employers. The resulting model has a union sector  where wages 
are set by collective bargaining and a non-union sector where wages are set competitively. 
The fo urth legal regime is today's non-union sector. The economic model that fits the 
non-union sector is the competitive model. but with an important twist. Competition 
operates in the external labor market (E L M )  where firms seek workers and workers seek 
jobs. Wages overall are set competitively in  the E L M .  However, afler being hired. an 
employee works inside a firm, and the firm can be viewed as having its own internal labor  
market ( I L M). The lLM inside non-union firms i s  a complex organizational structure 
where norms rather than legal rules prevail.5 Importantly, the [ L M  is not a textbook 
competit ive model. In addition to the norms of the I L M ,  the employment relation-
hip is regulated by statutory rules that govern the entire labor force, such as the Fair 
Labor Standard Act ( FLSA), the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA ) and the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (E R ISA). These statutory regulations govern 
both the union and the non-union labor market, but I discuss them as part of the non­
union market. 
The analysis below proceeds as follows: In section I, I analyze in depth the two goals o f  
the NLRA: first, industrial peace and. second, equalization of  bargaining power. Since 
the former emerges as the key of the two goals, section I I  presents a history of the major 
events whereby industrial strife was slowly replaced by industrial peace. The industrial 
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strife of this period was marked by strikes of uncertain legal standing which often turned 
violent. I n  section IlL I present the four legal regimes, introduced above, describing their 
main features and matching each with an economic model that captures the spirit of the 
legal regime. In  ection IV, I evaluate the success of the four legal regimes in achieving 
the goals of industrial peace and equalization of bargaining power. Section V concludes 
with the claim that today's NLRA can be judged to be successful because of the sharp 
decline in strike activity and related violence. In addition. perhaps unexpectedly. the 
non-union sector has become a vibrant part of the American economy. I argue that the 
success of the non-union sector is partly a result of the incentives created by the N LRA, 
which gives an escape valve for poorly treated non-union workers and a costly penalty to 
non-union opportunistic employers .  
I. THE BROAD GOALS OF THE NLRA 
A. Industrial Peace 
The preamble of the Wagner Act first lists the goal of reducing industrial strife. On one 
leveL this goal means reducing the number of strikes or the economic effects of strikes. 
But that barely scratches the surface of this goal. Industrial strife in the late 19th and 
early 20th centuries went far deeper, raising the question of whether the employees 
would accept the basic rules of the game. For instance. would workers cooperate in a 
political economy that did not provide for a legal ly  protected right to  organize and to 
strike? Would workers act to change the political system it self, whether lawfully or not. 
if their key demands were not respected? Would the United States electorate tolerate a 
political economy that regularly needed to call on the National Guard or federal troops 
to be deployed in American cities to break strikes. often using lethal force in the process? 
Not only was industrial peace given top billing by the Act itself, i t  was also specifi­
cally cited as the basis for declaring the Act constitutional. I n  Jones & Laughlin Steel 
the Supreme Court spoke of the deleterious impact of industr ial strife on interstate 
commerce, noting especially the immediate and potentially catastrophic effects of a steel 
strike on the economy.6 
Prior to 1 932, there was no federal legal right to strike, even peacefully; and indeed 
many strikes were illegal under state law or the federal common law followed in federal 
courts. 7 Employers often required that workers agree not to join a union or be involved 
in union activities during the term of their employment, and the federal courts held such 
agreements binding. Concerted activity by employees was not protected. If workers went 
out on strike and did not return to work when served wi th a state court ordered injunc­
tion, the striking workers were in contempt of court.8 When confronted by police or 
Pinkerton guards, strikes would often turn violent. The next move i n  many strikes was 
for the state governor to call out the National Guard to restore order. 
In the Great Railroad Strike of 1 877 federal troops were deployed in six states in major 
cities. including Balt imore, Pitt sburgh, Chicago and St .  Louis. Striking workers often 
resisted, resulting in considerable violence and many deaths. Certainly one could under ­
stand President Rutherford Hayes' concer n  that a revolut ion might be in the making 
( B recher. 1 997: Zinn, 2003).9 Imagine that scene today playing out on television and the 
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Internet. Industrial turmoil persisted well into the 20th century, as demonstrated below, 
further underscoring the desire to achieve industrial peace. 
Hence, when I use the term "industrial peace·· to describe what Congress was seeking, 
I am not only referring to a reduction in the number of work days lost from peaceful and 
lawful work stoppages. My focus is - and Congress' focus was - on the unrest that Jed to 
riots and to the eventual use of police or  military force to  restore order. 
A legal regime was needed to legitimize both unionization and strikes, but also to steer 
those activities into peaceful channels. I n  this chapter I will focus on this first goal of 
industrial peace because it was arguably the most important in terms of the workings of 
the economic system. 
B. Equality of Bargaining Power 
A second goal of unions is to redress ·'inequality of bargaining power."10 Whereas the 
goal of industrial peace is straightforward, the same is not t rue of the equality of bargain­
ing power. Indeed. the goal is not only complex, but also based on a flawed theory of 
economics, and, as a consequence, is internally inconsistent. 
First, the goal is complex because it has both procedural and substantive elements .  
On the procedural element, Senator Wagner himself said that the goal was satisfied 
if workers were represented by unions. I will adopt Senator Wagner's interpretation 
by equating the procedural element with workers' achievement of collective bargain­
ing status . 1 1  This provides a clear and measurable goal. The greater the percentage of 
workers belonging to unions and engaging i n  collective bargaining. the more successful 
is the Act . Hereafter, I use the term "union density" to denote the percentage of workers 
who belong to unions. 
The substantive element is raising wages. which it was hoped would reduce the l ikeli­
hood or severity of depressions. The traditional indicator of whether unions raise wages 
is the union wage premium, or the percentage difference between the union wage and the 
non-union wage . 1 2 Collective bargaining and higher wages were l inked . It was always 
understood that the collectively bargained wage would be higher than the wage achieved 
in the non-union sector.  
At this point in the analysis the goal.  albeit complex, can be cabined in  what appears 
to be a consistent manner. Simply stated, the procedural goal is achieved when workers 
join unions and engage in collective bargaining and the substantive goal is achieved when 
the collectively bargained wage is set above otherwise-prevailing wages in an unorga­
nized labor market. But that understanding of the second goal of the Act brings us to 
a problem that is not easily resolved. The Wagner Act was passed in 1 937 ,  before the 
development of the neoclassical model or economics and the modern theory of business 
cycles. Fundamentally the secOI'ld goal of the Wagner Act was based on tlawed and now 
outdated theories of wage determination and of business cycles. 
The labor market analysis at the time of the Great Depression was still rooted in the 
theories of Thomas Mal thus and John R .  Commons. M althus claimed that population 
growth would always leave a pool of unemployed workers that would keep wages at the 
subsistence level ( Mal thus. 1803 ). John R. Commons, one of the original giants of indus­
trial relat ions. extended the claim. saying that "cutthroat competition·' among workers 
set the market wage at the wage that the "cheapest laborer" would be willing to accept 
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(Commons and Andrews. 1927). To  remedy the problem. unions were needed to address 
the inequality of bargaining power. 13 
The modern concept of  competitive labor markets was undeveloped at this time. It 
was not until 1 932 that John Hicks published The Theory of Wages and laid the frame­
work for the neoclassical theory of wage determination; and it was several decades later 
before it became widely known or accepted (Hicks, 1 963) .  ln the modern theory of wage 
determination, the competitive wage is the wage that equates supply and demand. Both 
employers and employees are ''price takers:' · neither exercises bargaining power. The 
competitive wage may be a depressed wage in terms of some norm of acceptable living 
conditions. but i t  i the market outcome. But the conventional wisdom among policy­
makers when labor law was being developed in the 1930s was that of Commons and not · 
H icks.1� 
The business cycle language of the Act creates problems as well in  light of  modern 
neoclassical economic theory. The statutory language looks to unions to raise wages 
to counter an ongoing deflationary cycle where declin ing wages result in under­
consumpt ion and thus increased unemployment. The under-consumption story was 
a neat one but there was never any solid economic support for it, 15 and i t  was in the 
course or being replaced by Keynesian economics even as the Act \Vas passed. Keynesian 
economics posited that a combination of fiscal and monetary policy could reduce the 
severity or business cycles and maintain wages. That theory has been applied with con­
siderable success ever since. 
Today's economics textbooks do not refer to "' under-consumption" and there is no 
business cycle theory that ut ilizes it. Mark Barenberg (1993) investigated the under­
consumption story and confirmed these conclusions; he referred to under-consumption 
as part '·of the popular 'new economics,· but it was the new economics of the 1 920s. 
, . 
C. What Do We Make of the Two Goals? 
Two alternative stories can be told in putting these two goals together. The first story is 
the one told by the framers of the Wagner Act.  Industrial peace is an important. clear, 
and coherent goal of the Wagner Act. Moving from a regime of violent strikes and 
industrial strife to one of industrial peace is an extraordinarily important goal, if it can 
be achieved. Replacing industrial strife and unrest with industrial peace makes both 
employers and employees better off, and has enormous benefits for social welfare. On 
the other hand, a violent regime of illegal strikes, riots and the recurring exercise of police 
power bears the hallmarks of a failed industrial relations system . 
In  this story, the goal o f  equalization of bargaining power seems to fit neatly with 
the goal of industrial peace. Workers needed the protection of a collective bargaining 
apparatus that could resolve labor disputes peacefully. With this interpretat ion of the 
equalization of bargaining power, the two goals are complementary and both are needed 
for either to be realized. 
The second story reaches a very different conclusion. at least in a competitive 
economy. First, by the lights of neoclassical economic theory, the procedural and sub­
stantive aspects of the goal of equalizing bargaining power are inconsistent. The higher 
the union wage, the lower is the level of employment in the union sector. The substan­
tive goal of a high wage thu s  pulls in one direction. while the procedural goal of more 
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worker covered by collective bargaining pulls in the other direction. Second, there is a 
potential inconsistency between the substantive goal of higher union wages and the goal 
of industrial peace. The higher the union wage level rises above the non-union wage, the 
greater will be the opposition of management to paying union demands (and indeed to 
union organizing efforts generally), thus resulting in a greater likelihood of strikes. 
The inconsistency in the goals, however. depends very much on the political economy: 
the more competitive the economy, the greater the inconsistency. In  a competitive 
economy there would be a strong tradeoff between higher union wages and high rates of 
unionization, because both cannot be maintained. 16 If the political economy is less com­
petitive, the tradeoff is Jess dramatic: the greater the degree of cartelization of markets, 
the greater the ability to achieve both goals at the same time. And that indeed was the 
nature of the political economy envisioned by President Roosevelt's first New Deal 
legislative agenda. But the U.S .  economy has become increasingly competitive since the 
New DeaL with the shift away from a coordinated economy and toward a commitment 
to antitrust principles and with the rise of deregulation and liberal t rade policies. I n  this 
new environment, the tradeoff between higher union wage rates and union density has 
become sharper. The substantive and procedural dimensions of the goal of increasing 
workers· bargaining power have become irreconcilable. 
The complexities and potential inconsistencies inherent in this second goal of the 
NLRA is one reason for emphasizing the more straightforward goal of industrial peace. 
But another reason lies in the dramatic statutory revisions of 1947. When Congress 
enacted the Taft-Hartley Amendments to the NLRA, there was little question that it 
was see king to promote industrial peace, and to confine the scope and conduct of labor 
disputes. even at the obvious cost of curbing unions' bargaining power. So i t  is  fair to say 
that industrial peace was the one goal shared by the congressional majorities that pa sed 
the Wagner Act and the Taft-Hartley Amendments. 
II. INDUSTRIAL STRIFE 
This section focuses on the meaning of industrial peace and its opposite. industrial strife. 
The section develops the meaning of industrial peace through a brief historical narrative. 
Unlike the decades that are chronicleu in thi section. the U nited States today has little or  
no industrial strife. Consequently, it may be difficult for us  to picture the state of  indus­
trial relations in the decades beginning with the railroad strikes of 1 8 7 7  running through 
the passage of the Taft-Hartley Amendments of 1947 . 
The genius of the labor law reforms of the 1 930s and 1 940s lay in the fact that 
through trial and error they replaced a system marked by violent confrontational labor­
management strife with a system where d isagreements were channeled into a peaceful 
mechanism that avoided major disruptions to interstate commerce. Although a ful l  
survey of U .S. labor history i s  beyond the scope of this chapter, well-recognized and 
readily available scholarly references develop a good picture of the state of industrial and 
labor relations during this period. However, in order t o  assess the labor laws' objective 
of industrial peace. it is helpful to review what .. industrial conflict" actually meant in the 
decades leading up to the period of major national labor legislation. 
The violent strikes of the late 1 9th and early 20th centuries had a choreography of their 
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own. Companies frequently employed their own security forces to defeat strikes, whether 
the strikes were legal or not. I n  that setting. the strikes often led to  violence and confronta­
tions with local police. If the local police were unable to contain the violence and the riot 
conditions that sometimes developed, the governors of the affected states or the president 
would call out the National Guard or federal troops. The result would be a violent one, 
often with some deaths, before the military was able to restore order. To the authors of the 
Wagner Act. industrial strife did not mean orderly strikes. Instead i t  meant violence and. 
in the extreme, riots that had the potential to paralyze an entire city or region. 
The meaning of industrial strife in the 1930s was informed by a 70-year period of dis­
ruptive labor-management strife. The Great Railroad Strike began in 1 877 in the midst 
of a severe national depression that led to deflation in prices and wages (Dubofsky. 
1 994). After the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad cut wages and intensified workloads. 
workers went on strike in West Virginia and disrupted the movement of train traffic. 
Fighting began in West Virginia where state officers determined that they Jacked suf­
ficient police power to resume train traffic; they asked for the aid of the federal militia to 
end the strike ( Dubofsky, 1994). Although federal troops successfully restored order in  
West Virginia. vio lence intensified as the railroad strike spread to three other states. The 
arrival of state militia initiated street battles between the troops and strikers. On several 
of these occasions. employers called in the Pinkerton Detective Agency. which supplied 
spies, agents, and private armed forces ready and willing to combat unruly workers. 
Many blame their aggressive tactics for intensifying the fighting. 
The conflict soon spread beyond West Virginia. For nearly two days Pittsburgh was 
known as the "'smoky city'' as  nearly 80 buildings were burned, over 2,000 railroad cars 
were destroyed, and 24 people were left dead ( Brecher, 1 997) . Before the strike ended, it 
had spread to other cities, including Baltimore, Cincinnati. Chicago and St. Louis. The 
state militia failed in its efforts to retain order in almost every instance, leading state 
officials to request federal mil itary intervent ion. President Hayes granted all of these 
requests and dispatched federal troops to six states. 
Labor unrest was hardly limited to the railroads. As organized labor quickly grew in 
size, reaching nearly 3 mill ion members shortly after the turn of the century, the inci­
dence of strikes and violence also increased. A few other examples of the strike scene in 
the United States prior to the New Deal i l lustrate this point. From 1 903-05 the Colorado 
mining industry was immersed in a war between management and workers over wages. 
Unable to control the strike, the governor declared martial law and federal troops were 
used to break the st rike at the request of management. The period between 1 9 1 0  and 
1915 was commonly referred to  as an ··age of industrial violence" as u nions struck back 
at anti-union employers, culminating in the 1 9 1 0  bombing of the Los Angeles Times 
building. After America declared war in 1 9 1 7, more than 4,000 strikes broke out involv­
ing over 1 million workers. Citywide strikes broke out in cities such as Springfield. 
Illinois; Kansas City, Missouri; Waco, Texas; and Bill ings, Montana ( Brecher. 1 997). 
The primary legal tactic adopted by employers prior to the New Deal was the labor 
injunction. It was a highly effective tool to cripple or end strikes.17 If an employer whose 
facilities were affected by a strike could allege a danger of irreparable i njury that was too 
imminent to risk delay. a judge cou ld issue a temporary restraining order pending a pre­
liminary hearing. The preliminary hearings often resu lted i n  the issuance of a temporary 
injunction on the basis of employers' allegations alone (Summers, Wellington and Hyde, 
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1982). Judges had wide discretion in granting injunct ions and employers often succeeded 
in their attempt to choose a pro-business judge. Once an injunction was issued, workers 
who continued to pursue the strike might find themselves in contempt of court. and 
thrown in  jail without a jury trial; or they might respond with violence when the authori­
tie ought to enforce the judicial action. But if  the workers abided by the preliminary 
injunction and suspended their strike, the cause was often lost before the case could be 
heard on the merits. 
Industrial strife worsened during and in the aftermath of World War I .  First, t he 
shortage of workers during World War I helped galvanize unions to push for higher 
wages, and,  in addition, the number of workers who belonged to unions increased 
sharply. I n  this regard, the year 1 9 1 9  was pivotal. There were 3,000 strikes involving 4 
million workers , many involving mass riots and bombings. Even the police walked out 
in  the dramatic Boston police s trike. A major strike involving steel workers was broken 
up by federal troops and U .S .  marshals. Widespread strike activity broke out again 
during the summer of 1 922 among the coal miners and the railroad shop craft workers 
( Dubofsky, 1 994). More specifical ly, the coal miners· strike of 1922 was considered one 
of the largest strikes in American history, comprising workers in both bituminous and 
anthracite mines. The early 1920s also saw the first national railroad strike since 1 894, 
comprising 400,000 railroad shopmen and non-operating railroad workers. 
Adding to the tension and the political stakes, two American communist parties 
appeared, both with some presence in  the growing labor movement. Many business and 
political  leaders feared that labor demands might become more broadly political and less 
narrowly tied to improving wages and working conditions (Dubofsky. 1 994) .  Violent 
s trikes where federal troops or ational Guard units were deployed might enflame the 
more radical elements in  the labor movement that aimed to change the political regime. 
To the political es tablishment, the need for a peaceful resolution of labor strife became 
more vital than ever. 
The transformational decade for organized labor came with the Great Depress ion. 
As the Depress ion set in.  public demands for federal intervention and reform brought 
Franklin Roosevelt to the pres idency. The new Democratic administration sought 
subs tantive labor law reform that might avoid the strife that would likely accompany 
the severe downturn in business. The result was the National Industrial Recovery Act 
(N tRA) of 1933. The Act guaranteed workers minimum wages, maximum hours. and the 
right to form unions (Oubofs ky, 1994). 
Rather than bringing industrial peace. the legislative gains for unions resulted in  
more organizing activity. which itself became a major sourl:e of  industrial strife. Worker 
mil itancy increa ed as unions demanded the right to bargain collectively and employers 
remained equal ly adamant in  resisting labor's efforts (Oubofsky. 1994). Labor historian 
Irving Bernstein ( 1 970 ) describes the industrial struggle during this period as includ­
ing ·•strikes and social upheavals of extraordinary importance. drama, and violence 
which ripped the cloak of civilized decorum from society, leaving exposed naked class 
confl ict . '. 
Roosevelt attempted to calm the industrial strife with the creation of t he National 
Labor Board (NLB). Although the N L B  did have some success, it ultimately lacked the 
power needed to successfully resolve disputes (Dubofsky, 1994). Hopes for industrial 
peace ended when mass violence broke out in Toledo during the auto-parts worker strike 
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of 1 934 ( Bernstein, 1 970) .  Demanding a wage increase and union recognition. workers 
took to the streets to picket in mass numbers and to block the plant. Facing a crowd 
of 1 0.000, police attempted to enforce an injunction that limited the number of picket­
ers. Fighting erupted when police attempted to arrest five picketers ( Bernstein, 1 970) .  
The struggle continued over the next few days as tear gas, gunfire. and flying bricks left 
numerous people seriously injured. The arrival of the National Guard initially intensi­
fied the fighting. wou nding I 5 and kill ing two, but their presence eventually calmed the 
situation ( Bernstein. I 970). 
Sim ilar struggles broke out across the country the following year. Coal miners and 
truckers in Minneapolis and longshoremen in San Francisco waged bloody battles for 
recognition. while a cotton and textile strike spread from Maine to Alabama. With over 
400.000 strikers. and crowds nearly impossible to control. battles commenced on the 
streets of many or the nation's cities. St rikers struggled \-Vith police. using clubs. base­
ball bats and pipes. while newspapers denounced strikers. running publications with 
the headline "Commu nists capturing our st reets." As casualt y  numbers mounted. the 
National Guard was summoned to restore order on all three occasions ( Bernstein, 1 970) .  
On May 27.  1935. the Supreme Court found the NIRA unconstitutional in Schechter. 
The passage of the National Labor Relations Act ( NLRA) in 1 935 was thus President 
Roosevelt's second attempt. Conditions did improve in some ways - in terms or enabling 
employees to fom1 unions and seek bargaining. But industrial strife continued. Unions 
were emboldened by the new legislative endorsement of collective bargaining, while 
hostile employers refused to abide by the new legislative restrictions, assuming that the 
N LRA, like the NIRA. wou ld also be declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court 
(Gross, 1 974). Finally, in 1 937, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the N LRA, 
based on a massive factual  record detailing past industrial strife and its disastrous effect 
on interstate commerce ( Gross, 1 974).  
The Supreme Court's ruling in  favor of the NLRA curbed the concerted employer 
defiance of the Act, but it did not succeed in achieving industrial peace. I n  late 1 937,  
steelworkers waged battle against the steel companies across four states. Violence broke 
out as police attempted t o  disperse a massive crowd of strikers. I n  Chicago, fighting 
turned deadly. On a day known in labor history as the ''Memorial Day M assacre," police 
killed ten strikers and wounded dozens (Dubofsky, 1 994). Also in 1 937,  a wave of sit­
down strikes involved close to 400,000 workers (Brecher, 1 997) .  The union victory in  the 
General Motors sit-down of 1 937 turned the sit-down into a popular strike device. The 
Ford Motor Company experienced mass picketing at its River Rouge plant in the spring 
of I 941  after it failed to enter into negotiations with the U nited Auto Workers ( UAW) 
( Bernstein, 1970).  As workers attempted to organize. management did everything in 
its power to prevent unionization. Armed with baseball bats and clubs. union picket­
ers took on Ford's special police, who attacked their picket lines with bars and knives 
( Bernstein. 1 970).  
While workers were fighting for recognition, newly forming industrial unions were 
battling the traditional craft u nions for members at both the workplace and federation 
levels. Although the leaders of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) once 
proclaimed themselves allies to the American Federation of Labor (AFL), their affilia­
tion with the AFL quickly crumbled, and the AFL and the CIO began to compete over 
membership (Bernstein. 1 970: Dubofsky, I 994). The CIO supported industrial unionism 
436 Research handbook: economics of labor /mr 
( Bernstein, 1 970): i t  represented the more diverse and porous ranks of industrial workers. 
and became known for its more militant and socially conscious labor strategies. In con­
trast, the AFL largely kept to its practice of craft unionism and the representation of 
skilled workers (Dubofsky, 1 994) .  The internecine conflict between the AFL and the 
CIO only added to the level of  industrial turbulence at  the time. 
When the United States became involved in  World War II, President Roosevelt met 
with the nation's top labor and corporate leaders to develop a wartime labor relations 
system. The AFL and the CIO put their differences aside for the moment, and all parties 
agreed to condemn lockouts and strikes for the duration of the war ( Dubofsky, 1 994). 
Although initially a success, the wartime system quickly crumbled. By 1943 workers 
were engaged in a wave of unauthorized wildcat strikes that threatened production 
( Dubofsky, 1994). The strikes were unauthorized, but the unions often used the resulting 
instability to increase their contract demands ( Dubofsky, 1 994 ). After several wartime 
strikes that outlasted his mediation efforts, an angry Roosevelt condemned the ·'selfish 
preoccupations of civilians" and in 1944 supported a National Service Act that would 
require Americans to either work or fight ( Blum, 1 976) .  
The War Labor Board attempted to resolve industrial disputes without strikes or 
lockouts. But when dispute resolution failed, the government had a new policy option to 
help the parties resolve their disputes: executive orders allowing the government to seize 
companies . 1 8  During the war, there were no fewer than 1 8  executive orders centering on 
labor regulation (Sparrow, 1 996). President Roosevelt and President Truman conducted 
7 1  industrial seizures ( Sparrow, 1996). In fact, the number of seizures increased during 
each year of the war. and peaked in fiscal year 1 944 and fiscal year 1 945 ( Sparrow, 
1 996) . 19 Of the top 1 00 American corporations, more than one-third were seized either 
in whole or in part (Sparrow, 1 996). Among those seized were railroads, coalmines, and 
even the Montgomery Ward department store (Perrett, 1 973) .  
Roosevelt was not the only one frustrated by union demands. By the end of the war 
many members of Congress and voters no longer viewed organized labor as the under­
dog it had once been in the 1930s. Rather. it was seen by many. including some of its 
erstwhile allies. as abusing its new powers (Dubofsky. 1 994) .  Political and public frustra­
tion with labor·s tactics arter World War I I ,  along with Republicans' sweep of Congress 
in 1946. Jed to the passage of the Taft-Hartley Amendments in 1947. which had the votes 
to overcome President Truman ·s veto of the legislation. 
The passage of the TaCt-Hartley Amendments marked a major change in the legal 
regime and political economy established by the Wagner Act. The Tal"t- Hartley Act 
reframed the basic policy of the NL RA from one of encouraging unionization and col­
lective bargaining to one of neutrality, and of protecting employees' choice to unionize 
or not. It  also matched the original set of employer unfair labor pract ices with a set of  
union unfair labor practices that arguably targeted labor's most effective and disruptive 
economic tactics - the very tactics that had proven most effective in enhancing unions' 
bargaining power. 
Industrial peace would continue to be elusive for several years. but the passage of 
Taft-Hartley was the historical marker that represented the peak in industrial strife. 
Strikes thereafter were largely peaceful and more narrowly confined to t he immediate 
parties involved in the labor disputes. Moreover, in the emerging postwar prosperity, the 
public attitude toward unions and the ongoing frequent strike activity t urned from being 
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supportive to being opposed. Overall there was a political shift tO\\·ard conservatism that 
undercut public support for unions. 
Although the decline in  strike activity was to take place gradually over several 
decades. one critical and immediate result of the Taft-Hartley Amendments \vas the 
disappearance of violent strikes. The near century of serious industrial strife ended with 
Taft-Hartley. The National Guard and federal troops were no longer called upon to 
restore order and encourage peaceful negotiations.20 the employers' private police were 
less frequently deployed, and the president did not see the need to seize companies in 
order to protect the public interest. A nev.: sy tem of industrial relations began l O  take 
shape as employers and union leaders learned to successfully negotiate either an initial 
collective bargaining contract or a follow-up contract in a relationship that both sides 
assumed to be ongoing ( Dubofsky, 1 994). 
In the new relationship. most disputes either centered on contract interpretation. 
which was often resolved in  arbitration by a new cadre of labor relations arbitrators. or 
the development of a new contract. which was worked on by pecialized labor lawyers. 
The result was that the parties developed a kind of day-to-day cooperation, which 
enabled them to resolve disputes in a more peaceful manner off the streets and usually 
outside of the public courts ( Dubofsky. 1 994) .  
Although the level of  strikes was lower in the 1 950s than before the passage o f  Taft­
Hartley, it remained high by current standards. By the 1 960s. most strikes and confron­
tations between employers and employees took on a ritualistic character in which neither 
the future of the union nor  the achievement of a collective agreement was in doubt. 
Industrial conflict lost its association with political militancy, unruliness and violence. 
Yes, strikes were often still part of the ritual, but a new and more peaceful choreography 
had taken hold (Dubofsky, 1 994). 
The outright collapse in strike activity occurred in the 1 980s with the election of 
President Reagan. The election of President Reagan and the repudiation of President 
Carter's attempt for a second term speak to the underlying change in the electorate. The 
single dramatic seismic event in the labor landscape was President Reagan's decision 
to replace the striking air traffic controllers in 1 98 1 .  That critical decision emboldened 
employers to use economic weapons available to them under the N LRA, such as the 
replacement of striking workers when impasse was reached. 
For the last 20 years, strike activity has been a fraction - and a declining fraction - of 
its former self. What I describe as a maturation of an employment relationship into a 
peaceful mode was to union activists the beginning of the end for their particular vision 
of labor unionism. The idea that unionization would become the spearhead of a more 
radical reform of the workplace or of society dropped off the mainstream political 
agenda. In the widespread polit ical consensus that emerged after World War I I ,  indus­
trial peace and continued economic prosperity were favored over radical labor law 
reform or radical social change of any kind.2 1  
III. THE FOUR LEGAL REGIMES 
In  th is  section. I discuss the capacity of each of the four legal regimes to achieve the goals 
of industrial peace and equality of bargaining power. 1 focus on only a few of the most 
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salient features of each legal regime as they affect the achievement of the statutory goals. 
since a comprehensive treatment of even one of the four is beyond the scope and page 
limit of this chapter. I also match the legal regime with the economic model that best 
captures the rules of the regime. 
A. The National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA): Taking Wages out of Competition 
The N IRA was the centerpiece of President Roosevelt 's  first New Deal. Of the alterna­
tive legal regimes i t  had a critical feature that might have supported wide-scale unioniza­
tion in the United States: a coordinated policy of reform that would a ffect not only labor 
law, but also antitrust and corporate law. The theme was to replace "free competition" 
with managed '·fair competition. ''21 
The legal structure of the NIRA is known as corporatism. Corporatism emphasizes 
cooperation among interest groups or constituencies - especially labor and capital -
and between those constituencies and the government. The role of the government is 
to define an objectively cognizable "public interest" that is developed through active 
collaboration with the relevant constituent groups. Once the public interest is expressed, 
firms and other associations are challenged to adapt their policies so as to support the 
public interest. 
Within the consultative process. individual companies would be represented at the 
policy table by a trade association. Labor unions would also have a seat at the policy 
table representing employees' interests. At the national level, these constituencies are 
assembled hierarchically, with "peak associations" at the top holding the most influ­
ence with government policymakers. These peak associations are groups like organized 
industry-wide business associations or national labor federations. the broad membership 
of which is thought to discourage narrow conceptions of political interest. These peak 
groups are also expected to exert discipline among their constituent local groups so as to  
maintain cohesive support for national policies. 
In the incipient corporatism of the early New Deal, the constituency groups had to 
come together at the policy table to develop industry codes of practice. To bring this 
about. the administration sought to convene corporate leaders and union leaders from 
most of the major industries to deal \vith economic problems. One problem with this 
scheme was that unions represented only a small percentage of the private labor force 
at that time. Without labor unions that broadly represent employees' interests. industry 
codes would likely be unbalanced. rel1ecting only the interests or business. 
To provide a countervailing power to corporations. the NIRA actively encouraged 
unionization. The result was that union membership grew exponentially in the period 
following the adoption of the N I RA. In August 1 932 there were 307 federal and local 
unions affiliated with the AFL.  In July and August 1933 .  immediately a l'ter the passage 
of the N IRA, 340 new charters were issued to federal and local unions. In the following 
year. an addi tiona! 1 . 196 charters were issued. �3 
Codes of practice were adopted for most industries. Businesses were not forced into 
associations against their wil l .  Instead there were enormous incentives to join the process 
since the codes enabled firms to legally fix prices. At the level of the individual firm, 
participation in the process was critical since the codes were legally binding on the entire 
industry. For the individual firm to protect its own interests it had to join the process. 
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Similar incentives existed at the industry leveL If the trade association in a particular 
industry was a reluctant player, that reluctance usually gave way because the NIRA 
could adopt a code for an industry that  failed to adopt one ( Brand, 1 988).�4 
The economic model of the NIRA legal regime, stripped to its essentials, was to car­
telize indu try in order to prevent price and wage competition from feeding dellation. 
With higher prices and no price competition, companies could pay the higher wages 
demanded by newly unionized workers. The term "cartel" was not used to describe the 
codes' agreements, but that is what they represented; and it was this feature of the N I RA 
that encouraged corporations to participate. The opportunity to cartelize the product 
market to dampen price competition under state policy is a plum that should not be 
underestimated. 
Jn return for allowing businesses to fix prices, codes had to grant employees the right 
to participate in union activities (Hosen. 1 992). At the heart of the NIRA 's labor policy 
was section 7(a) .  which required that each code recognize the rights of employees .. to  
organize and bargain collectively through representative of their own choo ing free 
from employer interference:· Section 7(a)  was breakthrough legislation for the union 
movement. providing labor the right to organize and to do so without interference from 
employers.25 The exact scope of the right to be free from interference was never clarified, 
but it did provide the basis for limiting the employer's right to hire and fire based on an 
employee's interest in unionization ( Brand, 1 988 ) .  
Most important l y, the NIRA held out  the promise of a truly cooperative relationship 
between labor and capitaL The two constituencies needed each other. The cartelization 
of labor markets by unions helped employers to avoid price-cutting by competitors. 
The cartelization of product markets also provided the extra revenue to fund the higher 
wage. From a political perspective, management associations and labor unions worked 
together to form the codes of behavior that would guide individual actors. The national 
unions and even more so the federations were to be consulted on all industrial policy 
issues affecting their membership. 
The corporatist moment was too short-lived in the United States to provide a picture 
of how the fully formed policies might have functioned. However, the NIRA was the 
most radical attempt of the Roosevelt administration to reset the political economy of 
the country. I f  the N I RA had survived, the history of the labor union movement would 
look very different. 
With its emphasis on fair rather than free competition, the economic model of the 
NI RA does not fare well under the scrutiny of neoclassical economics. From a welfare 
perspective, an economy built around cartelized industries leads to  various inefficien­
cies. Wages are high, but because they are high relative to equilibrium market-clearing 
wages, the result is unemployment. Cartelized economies can also be inefficient because 
they stifle change. The conflict between neoclassical economics and the NIRA is hardly 
surprising, however, since the goal of the I RA was largely to replace the market 
mechanisms that are the cornerstone of neoclassical economics. 
The policies of the N I R A  would have proved much more appealing if the view of 
economics held by the Roosevelt administration had been correct. I f  the dynamics of  
capitalism did indeed have a tendency to regularly produce a deflationary cycle, then 
unions would have played a critical function. By engaging in  collective bargaining 
they would prevent downward pressure on wages, thus sustaining purchasing power 
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and averting the development of a deflationary cycle that was the plague of the Great 
Depression. 
B. The Wagner Act: Promoting the Spread of Unionization 
Congress was at work on a successor statute to the NIRA well before the latter was 
struck down by the Supreme Court. The heart of the Wagner Act, Section 7,  was largely 
a carryover from Section 7 (a) of the NIRA.26 Workers were given a right to join labor 
organizations, to bargain collectively and to engage in concerted activity such as strikes, 
without ·' interference, restraint or coercion'' by managementY Unlike the N IRA. which 
was broad in scope but lacked detail, the NLRA provided a detailed set of rules for 
both union recognition and collective bargaining. It forbade many employer tactics that 
discouraged unionization, including the creation of management-dominated employee 
representation plans; set up machinery for determining the union designated as their 
representative by a majority of the employees; and d irected employers "to bargain col­
lectively'' with the chosen representatives in good faith .  
The intent of the Wagner Act was to foster collective bargaining, and its proponents 
appeared to assume that the result of the Act would be that most workers, at least 
in  the major industries, would eventually become un ionized. Unlike the predeces­
sor N I RA,  however. the Wagner Act offered no tinancial benefits or inducements 
for employers to join in this endeavor. Moreover. while Section 8 contained a list of  
employer practices that would constitute an unfair labor practice, there was no com­
parable list for unfair union practices. This represented a remarkable empowerment of 
unions to organize new sectors and win extensive contracts. While the employer faced 
many constraints in resisting union gains, the unions had few constraints in  using their 
econom1c weapons. 
The Wagner Act also sought to solve an endemic problem of the N IRA, namely the 
lack of effective enforcement powers. The National Labor Board under the NIRA was 
created through an executive order and only had the power to mediate disputes. The 
Wagner Act created a new body, the National Labor Relations Board ( N LRB) .  to 
conduct secret-ballot representation elections and to remedy unfair labor practices. The 
N LRB was established as a quasi-judicial body. with the general counsel investigating 
and prosecuting unfair labor practice complaints. Cases were to be heard by an adminis­
trative law judge. whose decisions could be appealed to the N LRB and then to the U .S .  
Court of Appeal . 
To achieve its goal of promoting industrial peace, the Wagner Act provided for a legal 
strike mechanism which channeled concerted activity into a peaceful form: employees 
were given the right to strike, but that right was required to be exercised in a peace­
ful fashion. It was assumed that violence would render strike activity unprotected and 
subject to existing state criminal and civil laws. What was not entirely clear was whether 
Section 7 trumped existing state laws and protected all peaceful union activity.28 
I t  was also hoped that. by granting employees the right to bargain collectively, the Act 
would make employers understand the fundamental changes to rules of the employment 
relationship. Compelled to live with unions, perhaps employers would learn to cooperate 
with them. The result would be a more cooperative spirit vvhere the parties would resolve 
differences through negotiations.29 
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The cooperative spirit envisioned by Senator Wagner was an impossible dream from 
the beginning. I f  unions and employers fou nd it difficu lt to cooperate u nder the I RA. 
how could they be expected to cooperate under the N LRA? Under the NIRA, higher 
union wages would be paid for by consumers in the form of higher profits protected by 
the codes of conduct. Under the N L RA. however, higher union wages were to be paid 
for out of corporate profits since the employers could be forestalled from increasing 
prices by product market competition from non-union producers or those with \Neaker 
Ul1l011S. 
Whereas the economic model of the N IRA was to cartelize both product and labor 
markets. the economic model of the N LRA was to cartelize the labor market only. The 
difference is critical. In the economic model or the Wagner Act. product market competi­
tion continues unabated. There is no win-win here. only win-lose. That did not provide 
the foundation for industrial peace. Wherea the N IRA. i f  successful .  could take wages 
out of competition, the Wagner Act could only take wages out of competition if the 
entire industry. including all new entrant , were unionized and wages were bargained at  
the industry level. Under the best of circumstances that would take time to develop. But 
from the out et, staying non-union under the Wagner Act gave firms much lower labor 
cost ·, which provided a great inducement to stay non-union.;u 
Under the original Wagner Act, unions had considerable bargaining power over 
employers. For example, since there were no union unfair labor practices, the strike 
weapon could be used freely under the Wagner Act in support of union recognition 
(subject to the uncertain force of state law) . For example, when a union met resistance 
from an employer it hoped to unionize. it could boycott the employer, set up a ··recog­
nitional'' picket line, and then pressure that employer's business cu stomers or suppliers. 
through strikes or boycotts, to refuse to deal with the target employer. Through the 
secondary boycott. unionized workers in one firm cou ld pressure their employer to put 
pressure in turn on a resisting company, either to recognize a union or to sacrifice its 
business relationship with t he initial company.31 
The Wagner Act also allowed for "closed shop" rules which provided another pow­
erful source of union strength. Under this system, employers committed themselves 
contractually to hire only union members; thus employees had to be members of the 
union before being hired, and had to remain members or else they would be ftred. This 
was a very powerful organizing device. The closed shop concept fits the assumption 
of the Wagner Act that most workers would organize. If most workplaces were closed 
shops, then workers would end up being a rnem ber of a bargaining unit  whose terms and 
conditions of employment were set in collective bargaining.32 
Importantly, the closed shop also gave the u nion the power to discipline its own 
members. Members who engaged in a wildcat strike could be expelled from the union 
and would thus lose their jobs. The closed shop ru le made the worker a Joyal union 
member first and a loyal employee second, as the union might control employees' access 
to most or all of the jobs in the trade, while the employer only controlled those jobs in 
its own enterprise. 
In addition, the Act favored collective bargaining as the preferred form of the employ­
ment relationship and, implicitly, favored spreading collective bargaining throughout 
the economy. With collective bargaining, the wage that would emerge would be higher 
than the competitive wage. The Act imposed upon employers a duty to bargain in good 
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faith with "respect to wages. hours. and other tenns and condition of employment.'' As 
a result, the union could impose costs on the employer by using its strike weapon. The 
competitive wage would be the floor, and the effectiveness of the strike weapon would 
determine the pay premium that the union could achieve. 
In effect, unions were given the right to exercise monopoly power in the labor market 
by setting wages collectively. From an efficiency perspective, the higher union wages 
and benefits would be expected to cause a lower level of employment than would occur 
in a competitive market. The union's bargaining effect on economic variables is similar 
to that of a monopolist in the product market where the firm garners higher profits by 
restricting supply. 
C. The NLRA after Taft-Hartley: Competition between Union and Non-Union Firms 
The Taft-Hartley Amendments left the preamble statement of the Act largely intact and. 
in that respect, did not explicitly alter the goals of the legislation.33 There were, however, 
some highly significant modifications that implicitly changed the Act's goals. Archibald 
Cox in his famous article from 1 947 argued that Taft-Hartley changed the NLRA from 
actively encouraging unionization to being neutral toward it .  
Nowhere is this clearer than in  the revised Section 7,  entitled ''the rights of employees." 
In the original Wagner Act, Section 7 contained the sweeping language that employees 
had the right to join a union, to bargain collectively, and to engage in concerted activity 
such as strikes. The Taft-Hartley Amendments left those rights in place. but added that 
workers ''have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities ."  Taft-Hartley thus 
approved the legitimacy of the non-union employment relationship and removed one 
of the effective tools that union organizers had used since the N IRA; namely, the claim 
that, by unionizing, workers were following the policy adopted by two very popular 
presidents, FDR and Harry Truman. 
Taft-Hartley shared with the Wagner Act the goal of  industrial peace. I t  ought to 
reduce the industrial strife that continued after the passage of the Wagner Act and 
accelerated during World War I I ,  and it did so not by strengthening unions but by 
weakening them. Mo ·t of the changes brought by Taft-Hartley reduced the scope 
and etTectiveness of the economic weapons available to the union in organizing new 
workers. The secondary boycott, a very powerful but disruptive and ot'ten violent 
tool in unionizing new establishments, was outlawed. In addition, the Taft-Hartley 
Amendments sharply restricted the use of strikes or picketing for recognition when 
another union was certitied as the exclusive bargaining representative, or in the absence 
of majority support. As noted in the section on strike history, battles between unions to 
organize workplaces that were already organized were a major cause of industrial strife 
after World War I I .  
Critically. the Taft-Hartley Act also outlawed the closed shop. Under the "union 
shop" rules that replaced the closed shop, employees did not need to be members of a 
union as a condition of employment. Instead. the collective bargaining agreement could 
require that an employee join the union and was given at least 30 days from the date of 
hire to join.  Under the so-called ''union shop,'' unions lost control of the employer's 
available labor supply. The employer could hire a worker directly rather than through 
the union. 
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The union shop framework was a middle ground that loosened the control of the 
union while still retaining a strong union identification for employees. Although the loss 
of closed shop status was important to unions. i t  was minor compared to the effect of the 
·'open shop, .
. 
\.vhich severed the link between employment and union membership and 
gutted labor union control of the labor supplyJ1 And that was precisely what the Taft­
Hartley Act allowed the states to do, in what remains the Act's one explicit concession 
to state law. 
Under § 1 4( b )  states were permitted to pass ··right to work" laws mandating the "open 
shop.'' In a right-to-work state. employees hired into a bargaining unit job did not have 
to join the union or pay dues. The effect of the right-to-work laws, which were especially 
popular in the South. was to make i t  much more difficult for a union to organize and 
sustain a bargaining unit. The open shop creates a powerful free-rider effect so that even 
workers who are in favor of a union have an incentive not to join the union because they 
can enjoy the benefits without paying dues. 
Taft-Hartley also added a new Section 8 (c )  to clarify that employers have the right to 
express their views about unionization in response to a union organizing drive. Prior to 
Taft-Hartley. some NLR B rulings had put in doubt whether the employer could wage its 
own campaign against a union seeking to organize its labor force: Taft-Hartley made it 
clear that employers could do so. The enhanced ability and willingness of employers to  
fight unionization of  their companies was an  important factor in  stopping the spread of 
unionization. 
The main effect of Taft-Hartley was to limit the spread of unionization throughout 
the economy. Consequently, the economic model of the Taft-Hartley legal regime is one 
with both a union sector and a non-union sector. The relative difficulty of organizing, as 
well as the ban on the "closed shop," guarantees that there will be a vibrant non-union 
sector, especially in  the "right-to-work" states that require an ''open shop . "  In  the right­
to-work states� a non-union sector would likely develop even in industries that were 
heavily unionized in other states. 
The economic model of the Taft-Hartley Act has a non-union sector competing 
actively with a union sector. The automotive industry presents an important example 
of the competition between union and non-union firms in the same industry. The tra­
ditional unionized automobile assembly manufacturers and parts suppliers are located 
in the industrial belt around Detroit and Ohio, while non-union (and foreign-owned) 
assembly plants and domestic automotive parts suppliers set up shop mostly in the right­
to-work states. As a consequence of the lower labor costs. the non-union manufacturers 
can deliver a less expensive product. The result is steady erosion in the profits of the 
unionized plants and a concomitant reduction in union employment. The key point is 
that, for both parts and final products, prices are being determined at the margin, and 
the non-union companies are the ones at the margin and thus determining price. Union 
companies have little to no ability to pass through cost differences to buyers (Hirsch. 
2008 ) .35 
Commentators stress the importance of international trade, and competition from 
domestic or foreign companies' plants overseas. in  promoting a non-union sector that 
can undercut union businesses in the United States. G lobalization of markets makes the 
story easier to tell, and is important, but the same outcomes are likely without that story 
because of the persistence and cost advantages of the non-union sector in the U .S .'6 
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D. The Non-Union Sector: The Norm-Based Employment Relationship (and its 
CompetitiYe Advantage) 
The non-union sector has its own legal regime, one that has come to dominate the U.S .  
labor market in  a l l  but  a few industries and regions. Obviously, the employees in this 
sector have not exercised their right to union representation (or have not managed to 
garner majority support in  the face of strong management opposition) and hence are 
not regulated by most of the provisions of the NLRA.  The employees have little to no 
bargaining power and must act individually. Very few of them enjoy the protections of 
an enforceable contract, or of "just cause''-type job security, and they do not have a bar­
gaining agent to represent their interests before the employer. In a sense, the legal regime 
is marked more by the absence of rights than by the presence of rights. 
This legal regime has two components. The first is the employment-at-will doctrine, 
which governs the norms of the workplace. The second is a set of government mandates 
such as the FLSA, OSHA and ERISA, as well as Title V I I  and other antidiscrimination 
laws. 
The employment-at-will doctrine is often stated in the following stark form: that 
an employer can fire an employee for good reason, bad reason, or no reason at  all 
( Ehrenberg, 1 989) .  As I have argued elsewhere, the doctrine of employment-at-will is 
more of a jurisdictional boundary than a legal rule that is applied in its literal meaning 
(Rock and Wachter, 1 996). By stating the employer's prerogatives as broadly as possible, 
the employee who believes that she was wrongfully discharged simply cannot sustain a 
claim. (There are exceptions, such as race or gender discrimination or whistleblowing, 
that complicate the picture; but let us ignore them for now . )  
Take the case of a non-union employee who works in  a production o r  non-supervisory 
position and is discharged for what she believes to be false or frivolous reasonsY She 
may be able to bolster her complaint with evidence showing that she was never told of 
poor performance. that her regular job reviews were good. or even that the supervisor 
was lying about her performance. If the employee were to sue. under the strict employ­
ment-at-will doctrine. the case would be dismissed for failure to state a claim. The reason 
for discharge, or the quality of the employer's evidence, would be simply irrelevant. The 
purpose of stating employment-at-will so broadly is thus to cut off judicial scrutiny of 
such claims. and to avoid enforcement through the legal system. The courts accept this 
jurisdictional boundary by dismissing the suit. leaving the dispute to be settled without 
judicial i nterference. The employer thus retains almost complete discretion as to when 
it can discharge a worker. Moreover. under employment-at-will, employers can change 
terms and conditions of employment at will ,  too. 
If taken literally, this rule seems to promote rampant opportunism and unfairness. 
Some particular kinds of unfairness have been addressed, to be sure, by legislation and 
a variety of tort doctrines arising under the aegis of "public policy." Yet employment­
at-will survives insofar as employers have no general duty to justify discharge decisions; 
they may terminate employment for any reason or for no reason at all (as long as they do 
not do so for a reason that violates some statute or public policy ) .  
What then explains the almost universal fact that  the non-union employment rela­
tionship works without use of an enforceable contract for most of its terms? One pos­
sible answer is that employers are able to exploit their superior bargaining power over 
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employees and impose this unfair arrangement. But that begs the question of why some 
employers have not found it worthwhile to offer job security. perhaps in exchange for 
lower wage , to attract employees who value job security. A more complete answer to 
this question takes us to the economic model of  the non-union sector. Having discussed 
above the workings of the non-union E L M ,  the focus here turns to the workings of the 
labor market inside the firm; that is, the I L M .  As a consequence. the appropriate model 
is the neoclassical theory of the non-union ILM,  which is a component of the neoclassi­
cal theory or the firm. 
We first need to consider why a firm decides to bring an activity inside the firm ( the 
··make" decision) versus leaving the activity outside the firm and buying the services 
from another firm or entity (the "buy'' decision) .  When the decision is made to bring 
the activity inside the firm, decision making \vith respect to the activity is done through 
the firm ·s own hierarchy. The individuals involved in the activity do not contract with 
the employer regarding most terms and condition : rather most decisions are made uni­
laterally by the employer. The theory of the firm reaches a stark conclusion on this issue: 
when contracting is inexpensive and the firm has no core competency in the area. the firm 
will "buy:'' it will contract for the service or good to be provided by an outside entity. 
However, when contracting is expensive or when the firm has a core competency in the 
area, the fmn will "make.·· or bring the activity inside the firm. 
At the heart of the contracting decision is the level of transaction costs associated with 
the activity. High transaction costs make contracting costly and thus favor bringing the 
activity inside the firm. Low transaction costs make contracting straightforward and less 
costly, and favor leaving the activity to the market. Transaction costs are the costs asso­
ciated with negotiating, writing and enforcing contracts .  High transaction costs occur 
when the parties interact frequently, when the interactions are connected rather than 
independent events,  and when the environment in which the parties interact evolves over 
time. These conditions are a l l  present in an ongoing relationship such as the employment 
relationship inside the firm. The greater the number of contingencies that affect the rela­
tionship over time. the greater is the cost of contracting. Finally. the contracting costs 
are higher relative to the gains when the value at stake in each individual contingency is 
low. When the transaction is a low-value event. the benefit of contracting to protect the 
transaction is low, and hence even moderate contracting costs may cut deeply into the 
profits generated by the transaction. 
Transaction costs are typically high in the employment relationship due to a full range 
of factors such as whether the employee's training is firm-specific and has little use at  
other firms, and if the employer has access to  information, such as job risks, not available 
to the employee (Williamson, Wachter and Harris. 1 975). When transaction costs are 
high and contract governance is too expensive. the relationships are brought inside the 
firm, where they are governed by the intra-firm hierarchical governance structure. From 
the perspective of transaction cost theories, the decision to bring relationships within 
the firm is the decision to opt for the intra-firm governance structure over contractual 
governance within markets. 
With one important exception, the decision to bring the activity inside the firm means 
that the activity will not be governed in most of its particulars by contract terms: there 
is a contract. but it is radically incomplete, in that its terms are largely open and subject 
to employer discretion. The one exception is. of course. the unionized firm in which the 
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employees' rights and obligations are delineated in an enforceable collective contract. 
In the union sector, an employer's violation of the contract is prohibited by contract 
law - albeit a distinctive federal common law of the collective bargaining contract that 
is invariably enforceable through an internal grievance and arbitration system and only 
in  rare cases through litigation in  court. Moreover, the union's bargaining rights are 
protected by the NLRB against employer interference. 
This account of the non-union employment relationship, however, raises a serious 
legitimacy question: is this discretion used wisely and fairly enough so as to protect 
the reasonable expectations of the employees? Employment-at-will seems facially to 
encourage opportunism by employers. At least in past decades many employers may 
indeed have acted in this manner: hence the outbreak of strikes and violence. Today, 
employment-at-will is an accepted part of the non-union employment relationship, at 
least to the extent that i t  is not a serious topic of labor law reform at either the national 
or state level. In addition, although many labor and employment law scholars are ada­
mantly opposed to employment-at-will, I know of no empirical studies that claim that it 
facilitates employer opportunism. 
What explains the relative lack of employer opportunism in today's non-union sector? 
The answer is to be found i n  the unique nature of the employment relationship. The 
employment relationship is distinctive because it is  an intensively repeat-play game. 
The employer and the employees are in frequent interactions with each other over an 
extended period. The tasks evolve over time to meet new contingencies. Monitoring is 
costly and thus incomplete. I t  is  now well known that informal norm governance works 
best in  such situations because self-help methods are much more effective. In  this situ­
ation, an employer that engages in bad play by not following prevailing norms can be 
sanctioned by the employees through techniques running from work slowdowns to 
outright sabotage at the individual or collective level. In this situation i t  is  the firm that 
arguably lacks bargaining power, since the remedy - increased monitoring - can be pro­
hibitively expensive for the same reasons that contract writing is prohibitively expensive 
( Rock and Wachter, 1 996) .  
This is not the place to recount the various self-enforcing norms that  operate within 
the workplace. although one example will be helpful. The employment relationship is 
typically marked by the parties investing in their match . Starting a new job typically 
requires the employee to acquire firm-specific skills that are useful in the current job. but 
not with a ditTerent employer (Wachter and Wright, 1 990). Firm-specific investments 
create a wedge between the employee's value to her current employer versus her value 
to a new employer. If the employer pays all the costs associated with the firm-specific 
investments, then the employee's problem is obviated, but now the firm is vulnerable if  
the employee holds up the firm by threatening to qui t .  If  the employee has paid a l l  the 
costs. then the employee can be held up by the firm through a threat of discharge. The 
solution to the problem is for the costs to be split. The employee is paid a lower wage 
during the training period. but not a wage that reflects all of the training costs. After the 
training is completed and the employee now has valuable firm-specific skills, the surplus 
from those skills should be divided between the parties in the form of a higher wage 
for the employee and a more productive worker for the employer. The contract is self­
enforcing because both sides then lose their investment if the relationship is terminated 
early. 
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In  addition to the self-enforcing structure or norms. other factors are also at work. 
Reputational effects can be a strong deterrent to employer opportunism. Historically 
industrial strife often followed as a consequence of employers cutting pay during severe 
downturns in the economy. These downturns, and the resulting pay cuts, occurred at a 
time when the industrial economy was a fairly new development and employers were still 
learning how it worked. Nowadays, employers understand that opportunistic treatment 
of employees during the downturn will make it difficult for employers to hire during 
the inevitable upturn in the economy. Even during normal conditions, quit rates. or the 
percentage of workers who voluntarily quit a job each year. are remarkably high. with 
most of the turnover occurring in the early years of employment. As a consequence. the 
employer is constantly forced to hire in tl1e competitive job market even to retain a given 
SiZe. 
The ultimate deterrent to employer opportunism is the threat effect of unionization. A 
non-union firm will become much less profitable if unionized ( Williamson, Wachter and 
Harris. 1 975 ) .  Wage and benefits will likely be raised above competitive levels and the 
firm will have the transaction costs of negotiating a collective bargaining agreement that 
will also impose restrictions on its ability to unilaterally manage its workforce. 
The second component or the non-union legal regime is the extensive set of govern­
ment mandates such as the FLSA, OSHA. and ERISA, as well as Title VI I  and other 
antidiscrimination laws. Describing these mandates is beyond the scope of this chapter. 
They do however serve an important function in the workings or the non-union employ­
ment relationship. particularly regulating areas of the relationship that are prone to 
employer opportunism. Mandates such as ERISA and OSHA serve to remedy potential 
problems of information asymmetries. In the context of both employee benefit programs 
and workplace safety, the complexity of the issues and the employer's superior knowl­
edge of them create a potential market failure. The employer could tell its employees 
that the jobs are safe and that the pension plan i s  well invested when, in fact, the jobs are 
very risky and the pension plan is entirely invested in the company's own common stock. 
The problem is resolved by forcing the employer to disclose relevant information and 
imposing standards on pension plans and workplace safety. 
The solution in this case is government regulations that require the companies to meet 
certain safety standards for both the jobs and the pensions. I n  addition, the regulations 
force the employer to disclose relevant facts to its employees. Violations of the law 
leave the company facing civil or criminal sanctions imposed by the relevant agency or 
class-action suits brought by aggrieved employees. 
Mandates such as minimum wages, child labor prohibitions and discrimination-free 
employment serve a different function. Rather than correcting a market imperfection, 
these impose a public moral standard. Such regulations impose minimum standards on 
the theory that market-determined outcomes are unacceptable as a matter of national 
policy (Bennett and Taylor, 2002). In such cases, the outcomes of a $ 1  wage or the 
employment of a child under 1 0  may be efficient in that they do not hamper the opera­
tion of the price mechanism. But maximizing social welfare is not coincidental with 
economic efficiency. Society can declare as a national policy that certain outcomes. 
whether economically efficient or not. are simply unacceptable outcomes. Such policies, 
by reOecting the social welfare function. increase overall welfare and are thus the correct 
actions to take. 
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If government regulation proves to be an acceptable policy respon e to major norm 
failures when they emerge. the non-union sector can benefit from a bifurcated enforce­
ment mechanism. In cases where norm governance rules, such as employment-at-will, 
the enforcement mechanism is left to the private ordering of the parties. Where the 
employment relationship works poorly and employer opportunism is most likely to 
occur, as was the case with occupational health and safety and job discrimination, gov­
ernment intervention is used to resolve those specific problems with targeted regulatory 
solutions. This allows employers to use very inexpensive, informal contracting mecha­
nisms in all but those identifiable areas where management opportunism is most likely 
to occur. 
IV. W H ICH LEGAL R EGIME CAN BEST ACCOMPLISH THE 
GOALS OF THE WAGNER ACT? 
In this section I will evaluate which of the four legal regimes is or was most successful in 
accomplishing the goals of the Wagner Act:  industrial peace and equalization of bargain­
mg power. 
A. The N IRA 
Analyzing the NIRA in terms of its ability to achieve the goals of the Wagner Act is argu­
ably unfair to the N I RA because the Act's reform - the implementation of a corporatist 
political economy - was abandoned when the NIRA was declared unconstitutional. The 
time period for evaluating the success of the policy is t herefore too short to get a reliable 
reading. In addition, the N I RA, as workable legislation, was only a start . 
Even with these caveats. the NIRA receives some credit for being the first federal labor 
law legislation to provide for the right to engage in lawful concerted activity: both to 
unionize and to strike without interference from employers. The Norris-LaGuardia Act. 
passed in the final year of the Hoover Administration and only a year before the N I RA. 
had already provided for the right to concerted activity against federal court injunctions 
prohibiting such activities; but the N IRA recognized that employer interference was also 
a serious impediment to workers' right to unionize. 
The NIRA was an improvement over Norris-LaGuardia frorn labor· perspective. 
but it was very much a work in progress. Its language was aspirational and hortatory, 
and badly lacking in specific guidance. In  contract law, mandatory rules that cannot be 
varied by contract are rare because the relationship is entirely voluntary. But the union­
employer relationship is not the product of mutual voluntary choice. To ensure the 
viability of the union sector, core mandatory terms such as the requirement to bargain in 
good faith are necessary. In addition. mounting an organizing drive and bargaining col­
lectively are not simple matters in an adversarial relationship, especially one that i new. 
Consequently a more detailed legislative mandate was needed. 
The goal of the IRA was to change the political economy of the U nited State in 
a fundamental manner: free competition was to be replaced by fair competition. The 
new political economy would achieve industrial peace by creating a system of recipro­
cal benefits in the form of higher prices for employers and higher wages for employees. 
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The benefits would not only lead to industrial peace, but vvould also reduce the tendency 
toward def1ationary cycles in wages and profits. In this system. employers might plau si­
bly accept unionization. Although the employer might lose discretion in having to deal 
with the union, the cartelization of the product market would generate the higher prices 
necessary to pay for the higher costs of being unionized. 
As a practical matter, the N I RA failed on the ground, and the problems showed up 
almost immediately. Price-fixing proved difficul t  to accomplish. No sooner had the fair 
price been set than cartel members started cheating on the price to gain market share 
(Brand. 1 988). 38 Non-compliance begot further non-compliance. as code-abiding busi­
ness executives began to feel the pinch of competition from cheating firms. The hoped­
for stable higher prices were not achieved. 
The N IRA was no more successfu l in labor relations than it was at fixing prices. In  
the N IRA framework. u nions and business were expected to  exercise self-restraint  in 
their bargaining demands in order to support national priorities. Self-interest was to 
give way to the national interest. That did not happen (Brand, 1 988; Wachter. 2007). 39 
Organizational strikes became more frequent and bargaining demands grew in response 
to labor's perception that they had the Roosevelt administration and the law on their 
side, that disruptive disputes wou ld lead to mediation, and that mediators would  back up 
their demands (Dulles, 1 960) .40 President Roosevelt's call for moderation in  bargaining 
was ignored. Instead strikes continued to be frequent and violent, requiring the National 
Guard to be called out regularly to enforce the peace. 
The historical record of strike activity. as brief as it is for the N IRA, illustrates the 
failure of the NIRA to reduce industrial strife. Instead of providing for greater labor 
stability, the number of workdays lost to strikes tripled over the first three years of the 
N I RA (Brand, 1 988). Also, as shown in Table 1 5 . 1 ,  the average annual number of strikes 
increased dramatically from 766 in 1 930-32 to 1 ,8 3 1  in 1 933-35 .  
The N I RA does much better with the  goal of  equalization of  bargaining power. First, 
on the procedural element, the NIRA scores high since the percentage of workers from 
the private sector belonging to  unions increased from 1 5 .5  percent i n  1 933 to 1 6.3 percent 
in 1 934, as shown in Table 1 5 . 2  below. More importantly, the NIRA was the catalyst 
behind the surge in union membership that occurred in the 1 930s as the new unions 
formed during these two years provided the impetus behind organized labor in  general. 
Early organizing efforts were just beginning to show results. As discussed above, the 
advocates of the Act, including Senator Wagner, viewed collective bargaining as the 
antidote to unequal bargaining power. Hence, I can use u nion density as a measure of 
the procedural element of the goal. 
On the substantive element, the N IRA was also successful .  Although i t  is difficult to 
find a time series of union premiums - that is, the union wage percentage differential 
with respect to the non-union sector - the data suggest a union wage premium of roughly 
20 percent over the entire period covered by th is chapter. Although the exact premium 
differs by industry and over time, the evidence uniformly supports the existence of a high 
union wage premium over the entire period studied here.41 
Overall, the N IRA scores high as the first major legislation to grapple with the prob­
lems of industrial strife and unequal bargaining power. Much more statutory work 
needed to be done, but the N I RA was a good first attempt. I n  addition, it is worth 
noting that the N I RA was the most pro-union political economy of those studied in 
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Table 15. 1 Number o.lstrikes or lockouts, average annual, over relevant periods 
Relevant Period 
Pre- IRA Period 
IRA Period 
Wagner Act Period 
Taft-Hartley Period 
Years Covered 
1930-32 
1933-35 
1935-48 
1948-81 
Number of Strikes. Average Annual 
766 
1831 
3539 
4398 
.Vores: The averages were calculated using data on work stoppages from 1 929-81 from the U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics (BLSJ: Handbook of Labor Srarisrics, 1 975, Bulletin number 1 865, Table 1 59; Handbook of 
Labor Swrisrics. 1983, Bulletin number 2 1 75, Table 128: Handbook of Labor S!alislics. 1989, Bulletin number 
2340: and the BLS internet site, available at http://hsus.cambridge.org/HSUSWeb/search/searchTable. 
do?id=Ba4954-4964. This data set included all strikes and lockouts except those that involved fewer than six 
workers. After 1 9 8 1 ,  the data were no longer calculated in this manner and are unavailable. 
this chapter. The success of unions depends heavily on their place within the overall 
legal and economic structure of the country. The NIRA experiment provided unions 
with a seat at the N IRA pol icy table, a high-level policy position that they would not 
have thereafter. The NIRA also retlected an understanding that reforming labor law 
meant reforming other laws that guided the manner in which employers dealt with labor 
unions. If unions were to bargain for higher wages, the firms needed to have a way of 
paying for the higher wages without facing competition from non-union firms that had 
a lower cost structure. 
The question is whether the NIRA was a workable policy in a large and diverse 
economy such as the United States where competitive pressures are strong. The govern­
ment would have to wield a big stick to keep companies from undercutting each other's 
prices and to keep unions from making immoderate demands !'or better wage and 
working conditions. In any event. corporatism ran up against constitutional objections. 
and apparently lacked the political support it would have needed to surmount those 
objections. PresidetH Roosevelt abandoned corporatism, and thus the N IRA. after it 
was declared unconstitutionaL rather than attempting to revise the policy to meet the 
Court's objections. 
B. The Original Wagner Act's Ability to Achjeve its Goals 
One would expect that the Wagner Act would be successful in achieving its own goals. 
The law of unintended consequences might get in the way, but otherwise the Act should 
have gotten off to a good start . The record is more mixed. 
With respect to industrial peace, the Wagner Act created a legal strike mechanism that 
turned many strikes from violent ones to non-violent ones. President Roosevelt, at least 
prior to World War I I ,  was reluctant to call in federal troops. al though governors might 
still do so. The battles were still serious and disruptive, but now they were more likely 
to be union picketers fighting management's private police. With President Roosevelt 
favoring the unionization of the labor force. labor posed far less of a threat to the 
legitimacy of the established order. This was an important change. 
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Although less threatening to the established order, industrial strife, which had 
already increased during the years of the N IRA. increased further under the Wagner 
Act. As shown in Table 1 5 . 1 ,  in the years prior to the adoption of the N LRA. 1 933-35. 
the average number of strikes and lockouts per year was 1 .83 1 .  In the period between 
the passage of the Wagner Act and the adoption of the Taft-Hartley Amendments. the 
annual number of strikes was 3,539. Rather than bringing industrial peace, the number 
of strikes and lockouts nearly doubled under the Wagner Act:e 
There are several explanations for the worsening in industrial strife under the N LRA. 
First. particularly in the late 1 930s, many new unions were forming. undertaking their 
organizing drive and bargaining for their first contract. A high level of strike activity 
is not unexpected during this period. Second. the legal regime was particularly favor­
able to unions. For example, as noted above. the fact that there were no unt'air labor 
practice standards restricting union action meant that the strike weapon could be used 
freely except as constrained by state law. Third. the aspirations of union leaders and 
workers increased along with the more favorable legal regime. and rising aspirations 
translated into more costly bargaining demands which were difficult to resolve without 
strikes. 
The jump in industrial strife went along with a sharp increase in union density. As 
shown in  Table 1 5 .2, union density in  the private sector or the percentage of workers 
represented by unions was 1 4.2 percent when the Wagner Act was passed in 1935 .  By 
1939 it was 22.8 percent, and by 1945 it was 33 .9  percent .  So while the Wagner Act was 
unable to reduce industrial strife, it was able to increase union representation. That is. 
while the first goal was proving unattainable, the second goal was being achieved. Thi s  
underscores one of  the themes of  this chapter; namely that the goals of  the Wagner Act 
were potentially inconsistent. While a surge of initial organizing drives may worsen 
industrial strife, it does advance the second goal of equalization of bargaining power. 
A potential inconsistency in the Act turns into an actual inconsistency once the sub­
stantive goal of equalizing bargaining power is taken into account. Concomitant with 
the increase in union density, the newly organized union members were able to achieve 
higher wages and thus gained the union wage premium. Herein lies the problem. Who 
would pay for the higher wages? 
The N IRA had one answer: the consumers would pay. H igher prices would compen­
sate the firms for the higher wages, reducing the likelihood that firms would take a strong 
stance against the wage gains. The NLRA had a different answer and that was the source 
of the inconsistency: firms would pay for the higher wages through reduced profits. 
Although firms might be able to pass on some of the wage increases to consumers, there 
is no reason to suppose that they could pass on the bulk of the increase. 
The key question was whether all the firms in the product market could be unionized 
or cartelized. An aspiration of the Wagner Act was for the entire labor force to be union­
ized. thus eliminating competition between lower cost non-union firms and higher cost 
union firms. But achieving that goal would always prove elusive. As long as non-union 
firms could earn higher profits than union firms, firms would always have an incentive 
to oppose unionization and, more specifically. the higher labor cost bargaining demands 
of unions. 
Consequently, at the heart of  the inconsistency in the Wagner Act goals was the idea 
that the collective wage would be higher than the market wage. I n  other words, it is the 
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Table 15. 2 Private sector union densit}' ( 1 929-2010) 
Year Union Density Yea r  Union Density Year Union Density 
1929 1 2.4 1 9 57 34.7 1 98 5  1 4 . 3  
1 930 1 3. 3  1 958 33.9 1 986 1 3 . 8  
1 9 3 1  1 4 . 0  1 959 32.3 1 987 1 3 .2 
1932 1 5 .2 1 960 3 1 .9 1 988 1 2. 7  
1933 1 5 . 5  1 9 6 1  3 1 . 9 1 989 1 2. 3  
1 934 1 6. 3  1 962 3 1 .6 1 990 1 1 . 9  
1 935 1 4 . 2  1 9 6 3  3 1 .2 1 99 1  1 1 . 7  
1 936 1 5 .0 1 9 64 3 1 .0 1 992 1 1 .4 
1 93 7  1 9 . 5  1 965 30.8 1 993 1 1 . 1  
1938 2 1 .9 1 966 30.3 1 994 1 0 . 8  
1939 22.8 1 967 30.5 1 995 1 0 . 3  
1 940 24.3 1 968 29.9 1 996 1 0.0 
1 9 4 1  25.9 1 969 29.0 1 997 9 . 7  
1942 28. 1  1 970 29 . 1  1 998 9 . 5  
1 943 30.8 1 9 7 1  28.2 1 999 9 . 4  
1 944 32.4 1 972 27.3 2000 9.0 
1 945 33.9 1 97 3  *24.5  2001 9.0 
1 946 34. 1  1 974 *23.6 2002 8 . 6  
1 947 34.9 1 97 5  * 2 1 .7 2003 8.2 
1948 34.7 1976 * 2 1 . 5  2004 7.9 
1 949 34.9 1977 2 1 .7 2005 7 . 8  
1950 34.6 1 978 20.7 2006 7.4 
1 9 5 1  34.7 1 979 2 1 .2 2007 * * 7 . 5  
1 952 3 5 . 2  1 980 20. 1 2008 * *7 . 6  
1 9 5 3  35.7 1 9 8 1  1 8 . 7  2009 * * 7 . 2  
1 954 3 5 . 6  1 982 1 7 . 6  20 1 0  * * 6 . 9  
1 9 5 5  3 5 . 1  1983 1 6. 5  
1 9 56 34.7 1 984 1 5. 3  
No res: 
* Adjusted by Hirsch (2008). 
* *  Added using data from www.unionstats.com. 
The figures for 1 929-72 were compiled by Troy and Sheflin ( 1 985)  from union financial reports. Figures from 
1 973 onward are compiled from CPS household data ( Hirsch and Macpherson. 201 1 ,  updated at http://www. 
unionstats.com). The union density figure is calculated by determining the percentage of employed workers 
who are union members. 
Source: Hirsch (2008). Figure I .  
substantive aspect of the second goal that would prove to be the problem. Would indus­
trial strife have declined after the collective bargaining relationship matured? Again, 
there is no obvious  reason to suppose that a mature relationship would have become less 
cantankerous.  
In fact. the higher level of industrial strife continued throughout World War I I .  even 
in industries where unions were well established. This helped generate public support 
for what became Taft-Hartley, a retreat from the expansive power granted to unions by 
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the N LRA. However radical the goals of the original Wagner Act might have been. at 
least in the eyes of its most progressive supporters, much of the public was not buying 
the result .  
In summary. the Wagner Act scores high on the goal of equalizing bargaining power. 
With respect to the key goal of industrial peace. however, the Wagner Act was not a 
success. Strikes did become less violent compared to the strikes of the late 1 9th century, 
but violence was still a frequent feature of strike activity. In addition the level of strike 
activity increased dramatically, and this. combined with the continuing incidence of vio­
lence. was eventually deemed to be unacceptable. Whatever its success in promoting the 
bargaining power of workers, it was doomed to be replaced because it failed to achieve 
industrial peace. 
C. Did the Taft-Hartley Amendments Achieve the Goals of the NLRA? 
The Taft-Hartley Amendments transformed the original Wagner Act into a very dif­
ferent regime. It certainly changed the Wagner Act's balance between employers and 
union in favor of employers. It also supported the development of a vibrant non-union 
sector in almost every industry, thus raising the likelihood of direct product market com­
petition between union and non-union companies vying to sell to the same customers. 
With respect to the goal of industrial strife. the post-Taft-Hartley NLRA has been 
much more successful than the Wagner Act. While the Wagner Act had some success 
in reducing the level of violence and the political threat associated with strike activity, 
highly disruptive strikes continued in large numbers and the state of labor-management 
relations during World War I I  was an especially sorry story. The labor relations prob­
lems of World War I I ,  however, were not repeated during the Korean War, which fol­
lowed the passage of Taft-Hartley. Indeed, after Taft-Harley, violent strikes and the need 
for federal troop intervention finally disappeared. 
Table 1 5 .3  includes two strike activity calculations. In column 2, the average annual 
number of strikes is presented. Although informative, focusing on the number of strikes 
over an extended period of time can be misleading. The United States economy boomed 
after World War II and the growth in the economy, both in terms of output and in the 
size of the labor force, continued with only brief interruptions, at least until the last few 
years. In terms of its economic effect, even an unchanging number of strikes meant a 
lessening of industrial strife and that is what the data show. 
As shown in Table 1 5 .3, which provides decade averages in the number of strikes. the 
absolute number of strikes declined very slowly after the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act. 
(Note that the data are for strikes involving over 1 ,000 workers. This series is presented 
because the Bureau of Labor Statistics stopped collecting the number of all strikes with 
less than 1 .000 workers in 1 98 1 . ) The decline in the number of strikes, adjusted for the 
size of the economy, is more gradual and continuous. 
A factor that stands out in  the unadjusted strike activity data is the apparent effect 
of the election of Ronald Reagan in 1 9 8 1  and the subsequent firing of the air traffic 
controllers for engaging in an illegal strike on August 3, 198 1 Y Specifically, while the 
average number of strikes during the 1 970s was roughly 289 per year, this same figure 
was roughly 83 during the 1 980s. Since 2000, the average number of strikes per year 
has been around 20. But attributing the success of the Taft-Hartley Act in reducing 
454 Research handbook: economics oflabor /em 
Table 15 .3  A verage number o..f strikes ( involving 1 , 000 or more H·orkers) by decade 
Decade 
1 947-59 
1 960-69 
1 970-79 
1 980-89 
1 990-99 
2000-09 
Average N umber of Strikes (Unadj usted) 
330.3 
282.9 
288 .8  
8 3 . 1  
34.7 
20. 1  
Average Number of Strikes 
(Adjusted to 1 947 Employment) 
3 1 0.2 
225 . 1  
1 9 1 .0 
45.7 
1 6.0 
8.2 
Notes: This table was calculated from BLS statistics ( 1 947-2009 ) .  The data were reported as strikes 
involving l ,000 or more workers. The number of strikes was averaged over relevant periods in column 2. 
Column 3 shows average number of strikes adjusted to 1 947 employment. This column was created by 
using 1 94 7 employment as a base and then dividing the number of strikes by employment for the given year 
adjusted to the base of 1 94 7 .  
industrial strife to Ronald Reagan's action some 33 years after the passage of the Act 
is far too simplistic. After all, there was never a question as to the authority to replace 
workers who were striking unlawfully. What changed were the social norms of labor 
relations. 
The election of Ronald Reagan, like the passage of Taft-Hartley, speaks to the chang­
ing mood of the electorate toward strikes. The effect of that election and especially of 
the Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization (PATCO) firings was immediate 
and jarring for existing unions and their strategies. The decision emboldened employers 
to make more use of the economic weapons available to them under the N LRA, particu­
larly the right to permanently replace striking workers after impasse is reached in the 
midst of a strike.44 
What accounts for the success of Taft-Hartley in reducing industrial strife,  fo llowing 
the failure of the Wagner Act to achieve the goal? One of the theses of this chapter is that 
a key underlying factor - and this is indeed attributable to Taft-Hartley - is the growth 
of the non-union sector. One of the distinguishing differences between the Wagner Act 
and the Taft-Hartley Act is that the former took an activist pro-union stance, while the 
latter switched to a neutral position. While the former envisioned a country where most 
workers would belong to unions, the latter did not. It was the Taft-Hartley vision that 
won out. While the Uni ted States economy was booming, with a few recessions but no 
depressions, virtually all of the growth occurred in the non-union sector. Even without 
the Reagan effect, industrial peace would have been achieved. 
Non-union companies became a factor in nearly every industry. Mounting a cos.tly 
strike in a unionized plant or firm carried a much higher probability that the effect of 
any resolution of the strike would be a loss of union employment. H igher labor costs and 
disruptions in  the supply of any particular good or activity made it all the more likely 
that the buyer would switch to a non-union competitor who had lower costs and where 
disruptions due to strikes were extremely unlikely. The higher probability of losing a 
strike decreased the incidence of its use by unions. 
The growth of the non-union labor force takes us back to the second goal of the 
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Wagner Act and my thesis that the goals are in conflict with each other. While indus­
trial peace was tinally being achieved. the gains in the equalization of bargaining power 
were being undone. The data on union density are shown in Table 1 5 .2. I n  1 947. the 
year which marked the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act, union density almost reaches 
a peak. Union density plateaus around this level through the Korean War ( 1 950-53) .  
After the Korean War period, a steady decline sets in.  As of 20 I 0, union employment as 
a proportion of total private sector employment is 6 .9 percent .  
In  summary, the Taft-Hartley legal regime achieved the goal of industrial peace, but 
not the goal of union representation. With the Wagner Act, industrial strife increased 
rather than declined, but union representation grew strongly as well. This is reversed 
under the Taft-Hartley legal regime. Industrial peace is achieved. but not the equal­
ization of bargaining power. Instead. a vibrant union sector is replaced by a vibrant 
non-union sector. 
D. Does the Non-Union Sector Achie,'e the Goals of the NLRA'? 
In analyzing the success of  the N LRA as amended by Taft-Hartley. one needs to address 
the non-union sector as well as the union sector. As noted above. a key development in 
the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act was that the regulators moved from a one-sided goal 
of encouraging unionization and collective bargaining to one of neutrality, allowing the 
non-union sector to blossom. Consequently, we are interested not only in the effects of  
the legislation on the union sector; we also want to evaluate i t s  effects on the vitality or 
the non-union sector. 
The short answer to the question of whether the non-union sector achieves the goals 
of  the N LRA would seem to be "no," at least with respect to inequality of bargain­
ing power. Certainly the non-union sector is one where employers unilaterally set pay 
and working conditions. There is no explicit collective action involving employers and 
employees. If equalization of bargaining power is equated with collective bargaining. 
then the answer is definitional: the non-union sector has failed in the goal of equalization 
of bargaining power. 
Is there a longer answer that affords the non-union sector more credit for fu !filling 
the public policy of the Wagner Act? There is, and, perhaps ironically, i t  makes the 
non-union sector one of the great success stories of the N LRA. The longer answer starts 
by recognizing the importance of peace; it ends by questioning whether non-union 
employees truly lack bargaining power. 
With respect to industrial peace, the non-union sector in the decades prior to the 
passage of the NLRA was frequently a dysfunctional labor market, particularly during 
recessions and depressions. Remember that the industrial strife and unrest that is docu­
mented above occurred in the non-union sector. largely among employers that refused 
to cross over into the union sector and bargain with their employees' representatives. 
From a historical perspective, the episodes of violent strikes in non-union plants made 
that sector an incubator of industrial strife and unrest. Clearly, in those instances the so­
called self-enforcing norms of the non-union sector, elaborated above, were not actually 
self-enforcing. 
The non-union employment relationship is no longer a source of industrial strife. 
Employees are apparently not so frustrated by their inability to organize a union and 
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get employer recognition that they take to the streets, which they did in large numbers 
before the Wagner Act. 
What has changed? One obvious answer is that the non-union worker can now trigger 
the union option if the employer proves untrustworthy. Employees have a legal right to 
organize whenever they choose to do so.45 The threat of unionization is a powerful one . 
By replacing the non-judicially enforceable norms of the individual employment rela­
tionship with a collective bargaining agreement, unionization significantly increases the 
transaction costs of the firm. Replacing market wages with the significantly higher union 
wages and benefits reduces the competitiveness of the non-union firm. Consequently, the 
threat to unionize is a powerful deterrent that has likely caused the non-union employer 
to act in a more trustworthy manner, living up to the accepted norms of the workplace. 
However, the threat effect of unionization cannot be the entire story, especially as union 
density in  many sectors of the labor market approaches zero. 
The employment relations practices of non-union firms have also likely improved 
over time. Self-governing norms take time to develop and to be tested for effectiveness. 
In the wake of the decline in union density. a consulting industry has been established 
which can give employers either an off-the-shelf set of norms or norms targeted to their 
specific employment relationship. Those norms are embodied in employee handbooks 
as well as much of modern human resources (HR)  practice. Since labor costs are such a 
large component of total costs, the efficiency of the non-union employment relationship 
is big business. 
With respect to the equality of bargaining power, the non-union sector lacks the col­
lective bargaining apparatus, but it can make other claims to satisfy some aspects of the 
second goal of the N L RA. As noted above, the language of the Wagner Act points to 
the ·'stabilization of competitive wage rates .
. . 
There is little doubt among economists 
that the U n ited States labor market is highly competitive, with the exception that wages 
are downwardly rigid during recessions. Although this rigidity appears to be in conflict 
with the idea of the market being highly competitive, downward wage rigidity serves a 
separate competitive purpose; namely it is a component of self-enforcing norms in the 
non-union sector ( Wachter. Chapter 2 in this volume). The United States economy has 
gone through a number of recessions since the Great Depression, yet no one has made 
the 1 930s' claim that the downturn in the economy 'vvas due to depressed wages result­
ing from an absence of collective bargaining. Non-union workers may not act in concert 
or articulate their preferences through a participatory process; but the need to act in 
concert - at least to achieve the goal of wage stabilization - is not needed in today's 
competitive labor markets. The non-union sector does have a governance structure in the 
form of the self-enforcing norms that constrain management. Self-enforcing norms work 
silently. through the invisible hand, as it were, in terms of their adoption and retention. 
Although there is no formal '·offer/acceptance'' process, employees show constructive 
acceptance when they consent to employment and then do not quit with knowledge of 
workplace norms. Quit rates, in the form of workers voluntarily leaving an employer, 
are highly concentrated in the first few years of employment .  This suggests that workers 
do search and reject jobs that they do not like. Similarly. employers show adherence to 
workplace norms when they respect them. even though it  is costly to them in the short 
run. Moreover, there is evidence that the norms of the non-union workplace do change 
over time i n  a way that ref1ects changes in social norms. 
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V. CONCLUSION: THE SUCCESSES OF THE NLRA 
I return to the original question raised in this chapter: has the N LRA as it now stands 
been successful in achieving the goals of the original Wagner Act? According to my anal­
ysis, the N LRA has been strikingly successful in achieving its explicit legislative goals. 
I t  has not been completely successful because the Wagner Act' s  second goal of higher 
union wages and higher union employment is internally inconsistent in the competitive 
labor market of the United States: it is not possible both to increase union employment 
and to increase wages in the union sector above competitive levels. 
My positive assessment of the NLRA rests in part on the notion that the overrid­
ing goal of the Wagner Act was really to achieve industrial peace. It is illegitimate as a 
matter of national policy and deeply destabilizing to the social order to shoot striking 
workers as regularly occurred during the decades of industrial strife. The N LRA. as 
amended by Taft-Hartley, solved the problem of industrial warfare by creating a legal­
ized regime of union representation elections and a legalized strike weapon that has been 
choreographed into a peaceful series of steps between the union and the employer. 
Once the Taft-Hartley Act shifted the NLRA from being proactively pro-union to 
being neutral, however, the embedded conflict in the goals of the N LRA emerged as an 
insurmountable hurdle. While the Act favored higher pay, it also supported competition 
between the union and non-union employment alternatives. By favoring the substan­
tive goal of above-market wages, the union sector has largely priced itself out of the 
competitive labor marketplace. 
Critical to the success of the NLRA is the transformation of the non-union sector 
from a dysfunctional labor relations system that was an incubator for riots and violence 
into one in which employees can trust the employer most of the time to enforce the 
norms of the workplace. The NLRA gets a lot of  the credit for the transformation of 
the non-union sector, however unfortunate and certainly ironic this may be. As long as 
employees can exercise their inalienable NLRA rights to organize and bargain collec­
tively, the non-union employer has to play fair. The cost of employer opportunism is too 
high; namely that the profitable company will have to engage in inefficient bargaining, 
write an enforceable employment contract that introduces rigidities and, in addition, pay 
higher wages and benefits than the non-union competitor. 
I n  a very real sense, the union sector is a victim of the success of the N LRA in achiev­
ing industrial peace and incentivizing the emergence of a viable non-union employment 
relationship. Although a goal of the NLRA was to create a vibrant union sector, it seems 
to have created a vibrant non-union sector instead. Whether from the threat of union­
ization or simply the realization that acting opportunistically toward one's workforce is 
unproductive, the non-union sector has emerged as a central component of the N LRA's 
striking success. 
Could a different system have worked better in generating high union employment 
and industrial peace? The Uni ted States tried one of the legal regimes that would have 
made it  all work. corporatism as developed in the N I RA .  In the corporatist regime, all 
workers could be unionized - or at least covered by the major economic terms of union 
agreements. That would secure both the procedural and substantive elements of the 
equalization of bargaining power. The workers could bargain collectively at the firm 
level and their national or federation union would have a seat at the highest level of 
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policymaking, thus securing industrial peace. But that was not the choice that Roosevelt 
and the American voters made. 
NOTES 
I .  The author gratefully acknowledges the contribution of the criticisms and suggestions made b y  Cynthia 
Estlund, Sarah Gordon, Barry Hirsch, Sophia Lee and Howard Lesnick. The author also thanks Natalie 
DiTomasso, Sarah Edelson. Marisa Kirio and Conor McNally for research assistance. 
1 .  Hirsch and Macpherson (201 1 )  report that less than 8 percent o f  private sector workers belong to 
unions. 
3. This is from the preamble to the NLRA. 29 U.S.C.  § 1 5 1  (2006): ·'The denial by some employers of the 
right of employees to organize and the refusal b y  some employers to accept the procedure of collective 
bargaining lead to strikes and other forms of industrial strife or unrest, which have the intent or the neces­
sary effect of burdening or obstructing commerce . . . . ·· 
4 .  This i s  from the preamble to t h e  NLRA, "The inequality o f  bargaining power between employees who do 
not possess full freedom of association or actual liberty of contract, and employers who are organized in 
the corporate or other forms o f  ownership association substantially burdens and affects the flow of com­
merce, and tends to aggravate recurrent business depressions, by depressing wage rates and the purchas­
ing power of wage earners in industry and by preventing the stabilization of competitive wage rates and 
working conditions within and between industries.·· 
5 .  See Wachter (Chapter 2 i n  this volume) for a discussion of the ILM and the features that distinguish i t  
from the ELM.  
6 .  NLRB v .  Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 3 0  I U.S.  I ( 1937) ("[T)he fact remains that the stoppage of those 
operations by industrial strife would have a most serious effect upon interstate commerce. In view of 
respondent's far-flung activities, it is idle to say that the effect would be indirect or remote. It is obvious 
that it would be immediate and might be catastrophic.""). 
7. Many states, maybe even most, recognized some right to strike. But even in those that did, the federal 
courts could enjoin strike activity under the ·'general common law·· and their own version of ··equity ... 
both informed by a broad ·'liberty of contract."" 
8 .  See For bath ( l 99 l )  for a more detailed discussion on labor injunctions. 
9 .  Zinn (2003. p.  25 1 ) :  ("When t h e  great railroad strikes o f  1 8 7 7  were over, a hundred people were dead, a 
thousand people had gone to jai l ,  I 00,000 workers had gone on strike, and the strikes had roused into 
action countless unemployed in the cities. More than half the freight on the nation ·s 75.000 miles of track 
had stopped running at the height of the strikes."). 
1 0 .  This i s  from the preamble t o  t h e  National Labor Relations Act. 2 9  U.S.C.  § 1 5 1  (1006). 
I I .  78 CO:"G. REC 3678. 3679 ( 1 934) (statement of Senator Wagner) ("The primary requirement for coop­
eration is that employers �md employees should possess equality of bargaining power. The only way to 
accomplish this i s  by securing for employees the full right to act collectively through representatives o f  
their own choosing . . . .  The fathers of our Nation did not regard freedom o f  con tract a s  a n  abstract end. 
They valued it  as a means of insuring equal opportunities. which cannot be attained where contracts are 
dictated by the stronger party."). 
1 2 .  The union wage premium over the last 90 years has been calculated to be around 2 0  percent. The work o f  
Lewis ( 1 963) is regarded a s  authoritative for the first half o f  the 20th century u p  until the 1970s. Pen cave! 
and Hartsog (I  984) agreed with Lewis"s findings and placed the premium somewhere between 1 8  and 16 
percent for the period from 1 920-80. More recently. Hirsch and Macpherson (20 l l )  show the premium 
to hover right around 20 percent since 1 973 .  There has. however, been a decline in the premium in recent 
years. 
1 3 .  Commons and Andrews· support for this claim was meager. citing t o  Tawney's ( 1 9 1 5) study o f  the tailor­
ing industry that concluded. "as a rule. the girls work better if they are paid more."· See also Ernst ( 1 993) 
for an intellectual history of the Commons school and the economic theories it relied on. 
1 4 .  Hicks was 2 8  years old when h e  published The Theory uf IVages. Since h e  was not well established unti l  
his  influential Value and Capital, published in 1 939, his ideas spread slowly. 
1 5 . But see Est lund ( 1 993, p. 973) (The theory of ··underconsumption ·· or ·'mass purchasing power. 
.. which 
underlay much of the New Deal program, was featured prominently in the Act's preamble. and was 
repeatedly invoked by the Act's key supporters). 
16 .  To Senator Wagner. workers· participation in collective bargaining was more important than achieving 
the substantive goal of higher wages. See Barenberg ( 1993 ). 
1 7 .  See Summers, Wellington a n d  Hyde ( 1 982) (Enacted i n  1 932.  the Norris-L a  Guardia Act put serious 
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restrictions on the federal courts' ability to grant labor injunctions, made yellow-dog contracts illegaL 
and acknowledged the right of workers to engage in concerted activities. Section 4 of the Act prohibits 
injunctions against peaceful union activities such as striking or picketing. Section 7 of the Act goes on to 
further limit the issuance of such injunctions to instances where for example ··substantial and irreparable 
injury ·· will occur to plaintiffs property and the "complaint has no adequ ate remedy at law . .. ). See also 
Frankfurter and Greene ( 1930). 
1 8 .  O f  8 5  seizures from the Civil War period to the steel seizure o f  1952.  inclusive, only 1 8  o r  1 9  appear t o  
have been undertaken for reasons having nothing t o  do with labor disputes. See Kleiler ( 1 95 3 )  (referenc­
ing Appendix 1 1  attached to Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer. 
343 U.S.  579 ( 1 952) ) .  
19 .  Court settlements. however. peaked in  1 94 1 .  Perhaps this indicates a shift in tactics by the Roosevelt 
administration as labor-management disputes affected defense production . 
20. However. the National Guard was summoned for assistance twice during the year of 1 970. They were 
first called in during the 1 970 postal strike \\'hen the president declared a national emergency and sum­
moned both the National Guard and the U.S.  Army to deliver vital pieces of mail that. if  not deliYered. 
threatened to cripple large businesses. Troops were called in again during the 1 970 Teamsters wildcat 
strike. The unauthorized strike quickly spread across the country. Violence broke out in Ohio. forcing the 
go\'ernor to call i n  4 . 1 00 mem bers of the Nationa l Guard to control the rioting crowds and rock-hurling 
strikers. The strike continued for 12 weeks and concluded with a union victory. See Brecher ( 1 997. pp. 
273-6). 
2 1 .  Economic prosperity allowed labor to tend to its already organized industrial and craft base and gain 
higher wages and benefits. The reduction in new organizing in the private sector meant that unions were 
limiting their influence to the sectors that had already been unionized . Conseq uently. unionization \\'Ould 
not become a national movement. 
22. The goal of "fair competition" was featured in the preamble of the National Industria l Recovery Act of 
1 933, ch. 90. 48 Stat. 195 ("To encourage national industrial recovery. to foster fa ir competition. and to 
provide for the construction of certain useful p ublic works, and for other purposes .
.
. ) .  Section 3 of the Act 
provides for "Codes of Fair Competit ion . .. 
2 3 .  William Green. preside nt o f  the AFL. credited Section 7(a)  with adding 1 .5 million new union members, 
a more than one-third increase. by the time of t he October 1 933 convention. See Eisner (1000). 
24. Note Section 7(b) permitted the establishment of standards regarding maximum hours of labor. minimum 
rates of pay and working conditions in the industries covered by the codes, while Section 7(c) authorized 
the president to impose such standards on codes when voluntary agreement could not be reached. 
25. Section 7(a) states. ·'[E)mployees shall have the right to organize and bargain collectively through repre­
sentatives of their own choosing, and shall be free from the interference. restraint. or coercion of employ­
ers of labor, or their agents, in the designation of such representatives or in self-organization or in other 
concerted activities for the purpose of collective barga ining or other mutual aid or protection: [and) (2) 
that no employee and no one seek ing employment shall be requ ired as a condition of employment to join 
any company union or to refrain from joining, organ izing, or assist ing a labor organization of his own 
choosi ng . . .
..
. 
26. The change from the N I R A  to the N LRA and the early days of the National Labor Relations Board are 
described in great detail in Gross ( 1 974). Gross's work on the NLRB remains the premier discussion of 
these issues. 
27. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § ! 5 7  (2006). 
28. B ut did Section 7 trump existing state laws and protect all peaceful union activity. including secondary 
activity? Almost certainly not.  When challenged on the ·'one-sidedness" of the Wagner Act. proponents 
said several times that there was no need to create unfair labor practices since state law already regulated 
union activity. So the Board and the courts would have had to figure out just how far Section 7 protected 
activity that was restricted by state Jaw. We can be quite sure that Section 7 would not have protected all 
non-violent concerted activity. But that interpretive process was cut short by the relatively quick enact· 
ment of Taft- Hartley, which itself regulated union activity. Subsequently. the Supreme Court concluded 
that Congress had occupied the field of labor relations and preempted state regu lation . except for violent 
events. For a compellin g discussion of this issue. see Estlund (2002). 
29. Barenberg ( 1 99 3 )  makes this point most strongly. 
30. An alternative argument that used to be popular and is still included in textbook treatments of the labor 
market is the monopsony model. The claim is that firms have monopsony power in labor markets. If firms 
can exercise market power in setting wages. they can set the wage below competitive levels. The result is 
higher profits but at the cost of below competitive wages and employment levels. In this setting. the union 
arrives as a rescuer of both the employee and society. The union can raise the wage to competitive levels. 
thereby offseuing the fim1's monopsony power. Moreover. in doing so, the union leads the parties 10 t he 
competitive result \\'here employment increases as well as wages. Unfortunately. I am not aware of any 
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literature that makes a serious claim that the labor market. outside of a few isolated pockets, is marked 
by monopsony power that can be exercised by fin11S. 
3 1 .  For a discussion o f  a secondary boycott. see Frankfurter and Greene ( 19.30). 
31. Closed shop is different from what became known as the ·'union shop."' Under the ··tmion shop."' which 
was permitted by Taft-Hartley as long as state law allowed it. an employee once hired by the employer 
was required to join the union. 
3 3 .  B u t  see Gross (1995)  (''Taft and his supporters i n  the Senate argued that the conference committee bill  
left undisturbed the act's essen tial theory that [in Taft's words) ·The solution of the labor problem in the 
United States is free, collective bargaining." Whatever the merits of Taft's claim . . .  [t]he majority of the 
House did not intend to promote collective bargaining as the solution to labor problems. Their state­
ment of policy, not only in its omission of any reference to collective bargaining but also in its historical 
context, was intended at least to weaken. and possibly eliminate, collective bargaining .
.
. ). 
34. ·'Open shop" is a system that Taft-Hartley did not mandate but does permit states to mandate. Outside 
the 22 right-to-work states. unions can negotiate for a ·'union shop" by which employees have to join (or 
now pay an agency fee) within 30 days of starting work. 
35. See also Hirsch's contribution to this volume. 
36. A virtue of focusing on the globalization point is that it takes away any onus that may have been placed 
in the above analysis. If the competition is only within the United States, then the unionized firms that 
lose market share are less likely to find political support. If union workers in Michigan receive higher 
wages than non-union workers in North Carolina. where they are doing comparable levels of work, 
then it is easy to make a normative argument to support the competitive markets that lead to work 
leaving Michigan to go to North Carolina. If the work is migrating to lower wage firms in China. or now 
Vietnam, then the normative story is different. Almost no one would favor United States wage levels to 
fall to the level in the Chinese market. Hence. if the competitive advantage arises from the low wage level 
in China, then a policy argument to protect American workers from such competition is easier to make 
(at least to American voters). On the other hand. almost no one would favor building in constraints that 
would prevent jobs from migrating from Michigan to North Carolina. Yes. the migration benefits one 
group of American workers over another group of American workers. Bttt if both groups of workers are 
doing the same work. then it is unclear why government policy should favor one group over another. For 
a detailed discussion of this issue, see Cowie (1001 ). 
3 7 .  There i s  a contract. of course. even if it's terminable at will. a n d  even if its terms can b e  altered at will by 
the employer prospectively. The contract provides for a specific wage or salary. certain job d uties, etc .. 
all subject to change by the employer. It may have almost no prospective impact. but as to work that has 
been done. the contract governs. Most non-union. non-managerial employees probably work under a 
contract that is expressly terminable at will. by the terms of an employee handbook or other document 
that many courts are willing to give legal effect. 
38 . Referring to a "crisis in compliance" by fall of 1 9.33. 
39. See Brand ( 1 988. p. 94 ) (noting that the Depression did not elicit the "level of virtuous self-restraint" 
necessary for N I RA compliance). 
-!0. See Dulles ( 1 960. pp. '27 1 -1) ( describing the precipitous increase in strikes under Nl RA as workers fought 
for higher wages and union recognition). 
4 1 .  As mentioned above. Pencavel and Hartsog ( 1 984) confirmed Lewis's ( 196.3) findings and placed the 
premium between 1 8  and 16 percent for the period of 1 920-80. Hirsch and Macpherson·s ( 10 1 1 )  d ata 
show that the wage premium has typically been between 1 5  and 10 percent since 1 973.  
42 .  Although the number of strikes increased between the Wagner Act period and the Taft-Hartley period. 
the percentage increase in strikes decreased dramatically. Additionally. the number of strikes adjusted for 
the size of the labor force had declined. 
-!3. The Professional Air Traf ic Controllers Organization (PATCO) went on strike on August 3. 1 98 1 .  
seeking better working conditions and a shorter workweek. As a government union. PATCO violated 5 
U.S.C. § 731 1 ,  which prohibits government unions from striking. Historically. the government had been 
lax in punishing violations of this law. so it was surprising when President Reagan used it to order the 
strikers back to work within 48 hours of the announcement of the strike. The public was supportive of 
Reagan's tactics because the strike seemed to lack moral content; "the salaries and working conditions 
of the strikers scarcely generated sympathy among a public conscious of high levels of inflation and 
unemployment" and "the strikers had not only defied the law but also. as constantly emphasized by the 
Administration. had broken their oath." See Meltzer and Sunstein ( 1 983, p.  760) ( referencing Gallup 
polls as well as editorials from the major newspapers). 
44. The battle between the UA W and Caterpillar is a primary example. See Corbett ( 1994. p. 811) and Bearak 
( 1 995).  
45.  There is considerable debate on the question as to whether the legal right to organize is  fully effective. See. 
for just two examples. Weiler ( 1 990) and Gould ( 1 996). 
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